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Abstract

American politics has traditionally been dominated by major parties and their
candidates. Third party and independent candidates have rarely played more than a
peripheral role in elections, and when they have, it has only been a transient phenomenon.
Ross Perot's independent candidacy in the 1992 election was different. Perot was a
significant part of the 1992 election, he overcame a number of the traditional barriers facing
nonrnajor party candidates, and he received the second highest percentage of the popular
vote of any nonrnajor party candidate this century . Perot's continued involvement in
American politics following the election has made him unique among nonmajor parry
candidates, as he has defied the pattern of nonmajor party candidates fading into obscurity
after an election. Perot's continued involvement in American politics offers the potential
for significant nonmajor party activity in the future.
This paper examines the context and legacy of the 1992 Perot presidential
campaign. The traditional barriers facing modem nonmajor party candidates and the
historical context of Perot's 1992 campaign will be explored by looking at the candidacies
of George Wallace in 1968 and John Anderson in 1980. The 1992 Perot campaign and
Perot's post-election political activity will be discussed and evaluated in order to determine
the potential legacies of the 1992 Perot campaign.

The Context and Legacy of the ]992 Presidential Camnahm

IntrOduction
American politics has historically focused on two major parties, such as the
Democrats and Republicans, and the individual candidates they nominate for elective office.
Third parties and independent candidates have not been a significant part of the political
norm in America. Such nonmajor parry organizations and candidates have operated on the
periphery of American politics, only occasionally breaking into the political mainstream,
and even then only as transient players.
The independent candidacy of Ross Perot was a significant part of the 1992
election, and different from many previous nonmajor party candidacies. While there have
been many previous independent and third parry candidates for president, Perot is
uncommon because he was respecred as a serious candidate, he played a significant role in
the race, and was relatively successful at the polls. Perot received serious consideration
from voters , as is evidenced by surveys conducted during the 1992 campaign. The major
party candidates also considered Perot a serious candidate, as indicated by their decision to
invite Perot to share the stage with them in the presidential debates. The Perot campaign
was also unusual in that it was able to overcome a number of barriers regarding ballot
access and campaign finance in order to compete with the major party campaigns. On
election day, Perot further established himself among nonmajor party candidates, by
garnering the third highest percentage of the presidential popular vote than any other
nonrnajor candidate in American history.'
Perot's success in 1992 is cause for speculation about the potential for renewed
nonmajor party activity in American politics, and perhaps for the formation of a genuine
third party . Political scientist Theodore Lowi, who has recently begun to champion the
need for a third party, has noted that the 1992 Perot presidential campaign demonstrates the
I

J. David Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery (Columbia. SC: University of South Carolina Press , 1993),
p.3.
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potential for a genuine third party to develop . Lowi argues that Perot's 1992 presidential
bid was different from other nonmajor party presidential candidates because Perot's
support was not centered on specific issues and policies. Instead, says Lowi, Perot's
supporters comprised a large portion of an electorate dissatisfied with the major parties and
the two party system in general. Lowi regards Perot's strong showing in the popular vote
as an indicator that the time is again ripe for the formation of a genuine third parry. While
he is skeptical that Perot himself can form a genuine third party. Lowi has developed a set
of criteria that he feels would have to be met for a third party to develop in the future.
Perot's continued political activi ty following the 1992 election constitutes another
way in which he has distinguished himself from previous nonrnajor party candidates.
Previous nonrnajor party candidates have tended to fade into obscurity following an
election. or at least proven incapable of exerting much political influence. Perot has defied
the pattern by forming a national political organization called United We Stand America,
debating Vice President Gore on the NAFTA agreement, endorsing candidates in the 1994
midterm elections, and taking the first steps towards forming a third party for 1996 and

future elections . This continued involvement in politics is funher reason to examine his
role in modern politics and his potential impact on future elections.
This paper explores the historical context and potential legacies of the 1992 Perot
presidential campaign. First, the American electoral system will be examined to understand
the foundation for two-party dominance and the broad historical context of the limited
success for nonmajor party candidates. The specific institutional barriers facing modern
candidates will then be examined by looking at the most significant recent non major party
candidates before Perot, George Wallace in 1968 and John Anderson in 1980. Using the
Wallace and Anderson campaigns as recent historical context, this paper will examine why
and how Perot was so different and successful in 1992. Lowi's criteria for a genuine third
parry will then be examined, and applied to Perot's actions after 1992. The potential legacy
of the 1992 Perot campaign will be explored by incorporating the political changes Perot
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has induced since 1992, Lowi's criteria for a third party, and Perot's continuing role in
American politics.

The Roots of Two Party Domjnance
The electoral dominance of the Democratic and Republican parties is the current
example of the American political system's historical tendency towards two-party control.
However, the political system has not always been dominated by two major parties. In
fact, the founding father's intent was to create a system which would not be dominated by
political parties. In considering what form of government should be adopted for the
recently liberated colonies, America's founding fathers clearly expressed opinions against
the formation of political parties in America. According to A. James Reichley, a political
scholar who has studied American political parties, the founders believed:
Parties, by framing every issue in terms of winners and losers ...undermine this
indispensable willingness (0 seek at some level the common good rather than the
satisfaction of special interests . Parries, therefore, are socially destructive and must
be considered. as Madison wrote, a potentially "mortal disease"; (sic) as Hamilton
claimed, an "avenue to tyranny;" and as Washington insisted, a source of "frightful
despotism. "2
Despite the opposition of the founding fathers towards political parties, there was only the
briefest period after the Constitutional convention without organized parties. By 1788 the
Federalist party was founded, and by 1796, with the formation of the Democratic
Republicans by Jefferson, a foundation for two parry comperirion was established. It was
not unrill836 that the two party "duopoly in national party competition" was cemented
with the establishment of the Democrat and the Whig parries (later replaced by the
Republican party in 1854).3 Since then, two parties have dominated the political arena, and
third parry challenges, aside from the Republicans replacing the Whigs, have never been
viable for more than one election.

As appears in Gordon Black and Benjamin Black, The Politics of American Discontent (New York. John
Wiley & Sons. Inc.. 1994), p. 138.
.
3 Paul A. Beck and Frank J . Sorauf, Parry Politics in America (7th Edition) (New York, Harper Collins
Publishers, 1992), p. 33.
2
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How and why has a two party system established itself so firmly in the United
States, enduring like it has in no other democracy?' A number of explanations start with
"institutional theories," which focus on the institutions of American government and how
they are predisposed to offer a foundation for two party competition. For example, the use
of single-member districts and a plurality electoral system benefits a twO-party framework.
Plurality elections to elect a single representative for a district offer no reward to second or

third place finishers.> The candidate with most votes wins, and there is no consideration
given to the other candidates. Under such rules. a candidate can best achieve victory by
building a broad coalition of supporters based on a common ideology or goal, in order to
gain a large number of votes." The exercise of building coalitions to broaden a politician's
support "produces a pressure for two d istinct coalitions to emerge in each district,"? Broad
coalitions are favored by voters because of the clear choices they offer, and with broad
coalitions there is very little room left for alternative parties to define themselves.
The electoral process focuses attention on single person offices such as the
presidency and governorships, further hindering nonrnajor parties. The major party
organizations thus feel a certain need to compete for these executive offices, a fact that
works against local or regional parries "that may elect candidates in their own bailiwicks,"
but cannot build the necessary sUPPOrt to contend for high proftle government positions."
Therefore. a third parry must focus on organizing and contending for these executive
offices, a significantly larger undertaking than running at the local level.
A final institutional explanation for two-parry dominance is related to the system of
direct primary elections. Just as a two-parry system is favored by plurality elections, so
also does it benefit from the open nature of direct primaries used to select major party
candidates. Primaries offer "dissident groups an opportunity to compete for nominations

4

Beck and Sorauf, Parry Politics in America. p. 34.

5 Ibid.• p. 42.
6 Black and Black. The Politics ofAmeriC(JJ1 Discontent.
7 Ibid.
S Beck and Sorauf, Party Politics in America . p. 42.

p. 139.
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within the dominant parry,' providing a more viable option to candidates with dissenting
views than the alternative of mounting a challenge through forming a third ·pany.9
Another set of theories advanced to explain the two-party system are based on the
"social consensus" that exists among most Americans. Americans by and large have
accepted the fundamental "social, economic, and political institutions" governing the
country. As Paul Allen Beck has noted, Americans have "accepted the Constitution and its
governmental apparatus, a regulated but free-enterprise economy, and (perhaps to a lesser
extent) American patterns of social class and status." Without major division on the basic
foundations of American society, "the compromises necessary to bring them [dissident
groups] into one of [he major parties are easier to make ."IO The parries have also continued
to reflect the "social consensus" that characterizes American public opinion and have
worked to "prevent deep cleavages" that could provide fodder for a meaningful third party
challenge. Some political scientists believe the consensus agreed upon by most Americans
is now so solidified that any erosion that may be occurring poses "little threat to the party
system."11
While the two-party dominance may be rooted in institutional and social factors, it
has surely been protected and perpetuated by the major party organizations. Barriers have
been created by the parries to discourage and limit the effectiveness of third parties. Such
barriers include tough ballot access requirements in many states, restrictions governing
campaign finance, and maintenance of the electoral college system of electing the president.
Such restrictions and barriers are justified as being "'reasonable requirements' for
regulating the electoral process, but their real intent is to make it difficult for a national, or
even regional, third party to form. "12
The role of these barriers can be seen by examining the 1968 and 1980 presidential
election contests. In both elections, nonmajor party candidates encountered barriers that
9 Ibid., p.43.
10 Ibid., p. 44.
\1 Ibid., p. 45.
12 Black and Black, The Politics of American Discontent , p. 139.
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can be considered institutionalized in modern presidential contests. Examinations of the
nonmajor party candidacies in the 1968 and 1980 elections will also serve to highlight why
the Perot campaign was different from earlier campaigns. The 1992 candidacy will be
assessed in comparison with the barriers, challenges, and successes of candidates in 1968
and 1980.

Traditjonal Barriers and the 1968 and 1980 EJections
Nonmajor parry presidential candidates have traditionally faced a number of barriers
to entry into the electoral process. These include the legal requirements for ballot access,
difficulty raising funds or qualifying for federal funding, and the problems associated with
the winner-take-all electoral college system . Together these factors have served to restrict
meaningful competition in presidential races to the nominees of the major parties. The
effect of these traditional barriers can be understood by examining the third party candidacy
of George Wallace in 1968, and John Anderson's independent presidential bid in 1980.

The Election of 1968
The seeds of George Wallace's 1968 third party campaign were sown four years
earlier during the 1964 presidential primaries . Wallace had gained national exposure in
1963 for blocking the doorway at the University of Alabama to keep two black students
from entering. The popularity Wallace received for opposing integration encouraged him to
enter three Democratic primaries in 1964. Wallace received over 30 percent of the vote in
each of the primaries, and because of his strong showing he considered mounting an
independent campaign. Wallace stopped considering an independent campaign after
conservative Barry Goldwater secured the Democratic party nomination.'? Wallace

13 Sleven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, Edward Lazarus, Third Parties ill America (Princeton , NJ: Princeton
University Press. 1984), p. 110.
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considered Goldwater's selection an indicator that Wallace's primary appearances had been
successful at "conservatizing" the Democrats. 14
George Wallace's American Independent Party was formed during the 1968
presidential campaign because Wallace believed he could best represent the views of those
voters who did not share the beliefs of the major party candidates. Wallace believed that
America should continue to seek victory in Vietnam; that a "law and order" conservative
approach should be taken toward domestic unrest; and that segregation in race relations
should be promoted. IS Republican candidate Richard Nixon and Democrat Hubert
Humphrey both favored ending America's involvement in Vietnam. Nixon and
Humphrey, to differing degrees. also agreed on the need to end segregation. Many voters

did not share these stances adopted by the major party candidates. and were open to an
alternative, like Wallace, who better represented their views.
Wallace enjoyed significant southern support throughout the election and sought to
capture enough electoral votes to throw the election into the House of Representatives, a
move he hoped would induce one of the major parries to pledge his platform to gain a
winning majority. 16 Wallace's SUppOI1 among young, white, rural, southern males resulted

in the candidate garnering 13.5 percent of the popular vote, and 45 electoral votes in five
states.'? This was the third highest popular vote percentage garnered by a nonmajor pany
candidate in this century (see Table 1), and has since only been surpassed by Ross Perot in 
1992 . Despite this success, his plan to throw the election into the House was never
realized since Nixon won the electoral college handily, capturing 302 electoral votes. IS

Third Parties in Presidential Elections (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 13.
15 Ibid., pp . 11.13.
16 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
J7 Ibid., p. 18.
.
18 Theodore White, The Making of the President. 1968 (New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1969),
Inside Cover.

14 Daniel A. Mazmanian,
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Table

Top Ten
in
Election

1904
1908
1912
1916
1920
1924
1968
1980
1992

1

Third Party and Independent Candidacies
Popular Vote Percentage l
1900-1992
Candidate

Eugene Debs-Socialist
Eugene Debs-Socialist
Theodore Roosevelt-Progressive
Eugene Debs-Socialist
Allan Benson-Socialist
Eugene Debs-Socialist
Robert La Follette-Progressive
George Wallace-American
Independent
John Anderson-Independent
Ross Perot-Independent

Percent
Vote

of

2 .98
2.82
27.39
5.99
3.18
3.42
16.56
13.53
6 .61
18.86

Source: J. David Gillespie, Politics at the pexiphery (Columbia, SC;
University of South Carolina Press, 1993), pp . 296-297 .

Although Wallace had a relatively strong showing for a third party in 1968. his
campaign faced many obstacles not encountered by his major parry opponents. This was
not surprising, as third parties have traditionally had to overcome obstacles that the major
party nominees do not have to face, such as qualifying for the ballot Ballot access was not
even a consideration for major party candidates before, during, or after the 1968 election,
as they automatically qualified on each of the 50 state ballots . However. for nonmajor
party candidates, the process of qualifying for the ballot involves efforts in each of the fifty
states, since each state sets its own procedure for qualifying, with differing degrees of
difficulty . While some states require simple measures such as submitting a small monetary
sum or a short petition signed by supporters, other states use their qualification procedures
to discourage third party and independent candidates. Examples of procedures designed to
discourage alternative candidates include filing deadlines set months or even more than a
year before the election or petitions requiring signatures by a substantial percentage of the

9
state's registered voters. Some states have no procedure whatsoever for nonmajor party
candidates to qualify. 19
Wallace and the American Independent Pany were the first third parry in American
history to gain access on the ballot in all fifty states. However, the parry had to expend
significant amounts of time and money to achieve the same kind of access automatically
granted to the major part nominees. Legal costs associated with gaining access in 26 states
totaled $118, 175. This sum was greater than the amounts spent by Wallace's campaign on
polling, rental fees, and other miscellaneous costs. and almost as large as the $132,000
spent on postage during the entire campaign. Wallace spent $35,000 gaining access in Ohio
alone. and another $33,000 in California. Other non-legal costs associated with gaining
ballot access totaled an additional $169,180, of which $165.000 was spent in New York
and Massachusetts alone. More importantly, many estimate that if unreported ballot access
costs from the fall of 1967 were included, the total cost of getting on (he ballot in all fifty
States would reach $3 million, out of the campaign's total estimated budget between $9-10
million. 20
Wallace's achievement of qualifying for access to the ballot in every state did not
ensure that his party would continue on the ballot in future elections. Many states require
that nonmajor party candidates requalify for the ballot following each election. In many
states, procedures mandate that a candidate gain a certain percentage of the vote in order to
remain on the ballot for the next election cycle. Others require that a candidate requalify
altogether, regardless of the candidates success in an election ." Following the 1968
election, Wallace's American Independence Party remained on the ballot in only nineteen
states for the next election, and only six after 1970. meaning a substantial effort would
have had to have been mounted to gain access again in the 1972 elecrion.P

19 Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections , pp. 88-114.
20 Herbert Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election (Lexington, MA.:

pp.90-91.
21 Ibid., p. 223.
22 Ibid.

.

D.C. Heath and Company, 1971),
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The costs of ballot access would not have been so significant if the campaign had
not been funher disadvantaged by campaign finance barriers. The 1968 election was
conducted before the adoption of the major campaign finance legislation of the 1970's.
Consequently, presidential campaigns relied on party organizations for significant financial
support. Support provided by the major party organizations and committees included
contributions to their respective presidential nominee's campaign, help with coordinating
fundraising drives, and. after the election, loan repayments for debts incurred during the
campaign.P The Republican party helped Nixon with direct contributions totaling
approximately $2.7 million from party coffers. The Republican National Committee also
helped the Nixon campaign raise funds ; as a substantial list of contributors to the RNC's
Sustaining Fund was used as a foundation for Nixon's mail drive to solicit funds. The
Democratic National Committee and smaller party committees provided $5 million in
contributions and fundraising support for the Humphrey campaign . After the election. the

ONe assumed liability for over $6 million in loans and debts incurred by the Humphrey
campaign.e'
Wallace entered the 1968 race with a serious financial disadvantage. The two major
parties were in a significantly better position to aid Nixon and Humphrey than Wallace's
third pany was to aid their candidate. Wallace's campaign did not have the parry
organization's mailing lists. contribution potential. or assurance for covering loans, and
thus had to rely on small donor fundraising initiated by his campaign. Wallace received
over 75 percent of his contributions from donors giving $100 or tess.> These small
donations helped build a warchest, of between $7-10 million. This amount. however, did
not come close to matching the expenditures of the major party candidates; as $45 million
was spent by the Republicans. and $35 million was spent by the Democrats in 1968. 26

23 Ibid.• pp. 146-153.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 158.
26 Ibid .• pp. 79.86.
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While the Wallace campaign qualified for the ballot and mounted a challenge to the
major party candidates in all fifty states, the winner-take-all nature of the electoral college in
the general election continued to be a barrier to nonrnajor party success. The electoral
college awards all of a state's electoral votes to the plurality winner of the state's popular
vote (except currently in two states. Maine and Nebraska, where the electoral votes are
awarded in the same manner on a district basis). The electoral college has the mechanical
effect of discouraging third parties because state-by-state there is no reward for gaining five
or ten percent of the vote; all that matters is which candidate places first in each state's
election. Such winner-take-all provisions make the electoral college an example of
"Duverger's Law," a tenet of political behavior which states that winner-lake-all provisions

in plurality elections favor the formation of two distinct coalitions, a condition which
fosters the dominance of two major parties.F According to Duverger's Law, the electoral
college also has a psychological effect on voters. Duverger believed that voters would
understand the mechanical effect of awarding electoral voces with winner-take-all
provisions, and would realize that independent and third party candidates are nor as viable

as candidates from the two major coalitions. so that voting for a non major party candidate
in a sense would be "wasting" a vote. The logical effect would be that voters would tend to
vote strategically for the best viable candidate, rather than "wasting" a VOle on an alternative
candidate. Such baniers make the electoral college difficult for nonmajor parties to

compete.P While it is difficult to document the impact of the psychological effects outlined
by Duverger, the mechanical effect of the winner-take-all system has clearly served to
misrepresent election results and minimize the influence of third party candidates.
While the Wallace campaign does nOE provide any concrete evidence of the "wasted
vote" effect, the winner-take-all system did misrepresent Wallace's popular suppon in the
1968 election. Although Wallace received 13.5 percent of the total popular vote, the 45
27 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London, Methuen & CO. LTO, 1967).
28 Paul Abramson, John Aldriche, Phil Paolino, David Rohde. "Third-Parry and Independent Candidates in
American Politics: Wallace. Anderson, and Perot," Political Science Quarterly. vol. 110.
no. 3, 1995. pp. 352-355.
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electoral college votes he received in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and
Louisiana only represented approximately 8 percent of the total electoral college vote. 29

In the context of nonmajor party candidates, Wallace received a relatively good
showing in the electoral college. In 1924 Robert La Follette received 16.5 percent of the
popular vote, and only received 13 electoral college votes. Of the 16 non major party
candidacies receiving 1 percent of the popular vote before WaUace, only 3 had received
electoral votes, and only Roosevelt's 1912 campaign had won a larger share of the electoral
college vote. 30 The poor showings of nonrnajor parry candidates in the twentieth century
underlines how unrepresentative the college has been for nonmajor party candidates.
The electoral college also undermines nonmajor party efforts because it potentially
provides limits on the number of states where a candidate can be competitive. If a given
state is dominated by voters who support one particular political parry, that state is likely to
award its electoral votes to that parry's candidate. In states where voters overwhelmingly
suppon one party, it limits the competitiveness of other parry candidates in that Slate, and
provides the favored parry with a head stan on the electoral vote count. A state's trend of
voting for a particular party in a series of presidential elections provides a basis for
considering such a state to be dominated by voters of that parry, and to be predisposed to
continue supporting that party. For instance, in elections between 1948 and 1968 (aside
from the Johnson Democratic landslide in 1964), only four of the seventeen states west of
the Mississippi had supponed a Democratic nominee in one election.'! These Republican
states were uncontestable under the winner take all system, meaning that Wallace had a
limited number of states in which he could realistically compete with the major parties.

29 based on election results in Theodore White, The making of the President, 1968 , Inside Cover.
30
31

Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery, pp. 296-7'
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections (Brd ed.) (Washington, D.C. : Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1994), p. 47.
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The Election of 1980
The John Anderson campaign in 1980 differed from the 1968 Wallace campaign in
many ways . The reasons Anderson ran, the manner in which he challenged the major party
nominees, how he was affected by the traditional barriers, and his suppon on election day
were all different from Wallace's campaign in 1968.
The 1980 National Unity Campaign of independent candidate John Anderson
started after Anderson fared poorly in the Republican party presidential primaries.
Anderson had the experience of 20 years in the House representing Illinois when he
decided

(0

run for President. There were no major divisive issues that distinguished

Anderson from Republican nominee Ronald Reagan and incumbent Democratic President
Carter. Rather, Anderson justified his candidacy by citing an alarming shift to the right in
the Republican parry that left link room for more moderate members like himself. He
campaigned on a progressive platform promoting gun control, an increased gas tax, no new
nuclear programs, support for the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, more security for
homemakers, and better child care for working parents. Anderson's decision to run was
also a result of his dissatisfaction with the major party nominees. Anderson felt Carter had
failed as a president, and Reagan was too old and out of touch to represent not only
Republicans, but America in general. Anderson's campaign attracted many independents
disenfranchised with the major parties, and found support from progressive moderates of
both parties. He received 6.6 percent of the popular VOle without winning any states,
falling far short of his own goals and those of critics who had relegated him to being a
"spoiler" who could send the election to the House.P
Like Wallace, Anderson overcame the significant hurdle to qualify for the ballot in
all fifty states, but only after a prolonged and costly effort, When he announced his

independent candidacy on June 8, 1980, deadlines for filing as an independent had passed
in five states (Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, and Ohio).33 Rather than forsake
32

Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery. pp. 122· L26.

33 Herbert ALexander. Financing the 1980 Election (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 350.

14
the opportunity to compete in these states, Anderson decided to challenge the early
deadlines in coun. Anderson contended that such early deadlines were unreasonable
because the primary season was not finished and the major party candidates were not
known. The deadlines were thus set too early for potential independent candidates to
decide on a challenge.r' In addition. five other states (New York, West Virginia, Arizona,
Nebraska, and Texas) had measures that forbade primary voters to sign petitions for
independents, and North Carolina even had a "sore loser" stature that disqualified
candidates who had run in primaries from later registering as independents. Utah
discouraged independent candidacies by requiring that each signature on petitions be
notarized. and Michigan did not even have a ballot access procedure for independent
candidates.V
The task of qualifying was complicated by the initial opposition of the Caner
campaign and the DNC. Early in Anderson's effon Democratic strategists discussed plans
to spend money to challenge the independent's ballot access. In May and June the media

reported that the DNC had supposedly earmarked over $200,000 to fight Anderson's ballot
access campaign.v and some stories reported that the DNC had retained lawyers to aid
citizens challenging Anderson.'? The DNe denied rumors of earmarking money to fight
Anderson, but was open about wishing to challenge the independent candidate. The
maintained this position until late June when Anderson's support began to rise. At this
point Caner took a more conciliatory approach towards Anderson to avoid angering
potential moderate supporters."
The Anderson campaign spent upwards of $2 million to qualify for the ballot in all
fifty states. Over $1 million was spent carrying out state petition drives, another $250,000
on the necessary administrators to coordinate the effort. and $672,000 on legal costs.'?
34

Ibid.• p. 350.

35 Ibid., p. 350.
36 Ibid., p. 341.
31 "Democrats Said LO Join Lawsuit Against Anderson:' New York Times. June 14. 1980. p. A8.
38

"Carter Dons Kid Gloves in Anti-Anderson Effort." Christian. Science Monitor, June 19. 1980. p. 4.

39 Alexander. Financing the 1980 Election. p. 351.
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The legal costs were mostly a result of the challenges that had to be brought in states with
early deadlines or similar discouraging statutes. Despite Anderson's effons to change
ballot access rules in 1980. they continued to discourage nonmajor party action in later
elections. In fact, part of Anderson's decision not to run again in the 1984 election as an
independent was based on a failed $100,000 effort to qualify for the ballot in California in
between elections.w
The finance barriers challenging nonmajor party candidates significantly changed
during the 1970s as a result of the adoption of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
While the FECA was intended to reform campaign finance and provide a more level playing
field for potential candidates, the act created greater obstacles for nonmajor pany
candidates. One objective of the FECA was to limit the appearance of corruption and the
influence of large "fat cat" donors. To achieve this goal the act established a number of
contribution limits. For instance, the act limited individual contributions to $1,000 and
contributions made by multicandidate political action committees were limited. to $5,000.
This meant that candidates could no longer rely on large contributions from rich individuals
and companies to finance their campaigns. The act also sought to limit the soaring costs of
presidential campaigns. To control these costs, the act set a number of expenditure limits
for different stages of presidential campaigns. The FECA also required full public
disclosure of all donations and expenditures, creating funher compliance costs for the

campaigns.v'
Compliance with these expenditure limits for presidential candidates was voluntary,
but voluntary cooperation was required in order to take advantage of public funding
provisions also included in the FECA. The act established the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund, which by means of a checkoff on a voter's tax filings, would collect and
supply qualified candidates with funding . The fund provides qualified candidates with
matching funds in the primary campaigns, money for national conventions, and funding for
40 Herbert Alexander, Financing the 1984 Election (Lex ington , MA : Lexington Books, 1987), p. 384.
41 Anthony Corrado, Paying for Presidents (New York: The Twentieth Century Press, 1993), pp. 1-59.
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the general election campaign.P In order to qualify for this funding, candidates had to
agree to the contribution and expenditure limits outlined in the FECA. In the general
election campaign, candidates who accepted the full public subsidy also had to agree not to
raise any private monies for their campaign.
Public financing was automatically available and approved for the major parry
candidates who agreed to the contribution and expenditure limits. Public financing
provided the major pany candidates in 1980 with over $5 million each in matching funds
during the primaries, a combined $8 million for the party nominating conventions, and over
$29 million for each candidate to spend in the general election.v However, third parry
candidates could only qualify for retroactive funding following the election, and there were
no provisions to supply funding in any way for independent candidates. Even when a third
party candidate qualifies for retroactive funding under the FECA provisions, it is only a
small proportion of what the major party candidates receive . Under the law, a nonmajor
party candidate who receives at least 5 percent of the total popular vote receives a
proportionate share based on the average vote of the two major party candidates. For
instance, if a third party candidate were to receive 20 percent of the popular vote, and the
major parry candidates an average of 40 percent, the third party candidate would receive the
proportionate amount (50 percent) of the total amount awarded

10

the major parry

candidates." In order to potentially qualify for this retroactive funding after the campaign,
nonmajor parry candidates are obliged

(0

observe the restrictive limits on contributions and

expenditures throughout the entire campaign. Lastly, before qualifying for retroactive
funding is even assured, nonmajor party candidates are expected to comply with disclosure
requirements, which forces them to incur additional legal costs."
While Anderson was hindered by the campaign finance barriers facing an
independent candidate, he did manage to make some headway in challenging the obstacles
42 [bid.
43 Alexander, Financing the
44 Ibid., p. 346.
45 Ibid .. p. 342.
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created by the new law. A victory for the campaign came in early September with a ruling
by the FEC that as an independent candidate, Anderson could qualify for retroactive federal
funding following the election. The conditions established for independent candidates to
qualify for retroactive funding were the same as those established for third parties,
including receiving at least 5% of the popular vote in the general election, and that
Anderson would be limited to receiving only a proportionate share of the full subsidy
provided to the major party candidates."
The FEC ruling on retroactive federal funding provided Anderson with the
opportunity to use the prospective retroactive funding to secure bank loans for the final
weeks of the campaign. However, the Carter campaign also sought to limit access to this
source of funds. The Carter campaign leaked a letter to banks hinting that loans to
Anderson could break their bank charters because repayment of the loans was not assured,
because the funding would only occur if Anderson received 5 percent of the popular vote.
Anderson contested his inability to secure substantial loans. and on October 2 the FEC
ruled that banks could legally lend to the Anderson campaign. Eventually Anderson
received $4.2 million in public monies.t? But the loans and assurances of retroactive
funding were not enough to support his campaign . Consequently, the independent had to
rely on private solicitarions, especially direct mail fundraising to generate the contributions
that made up most of the campaign fund ."
The major parties also enjoyed other advantages under the FECA campaign finance
rules. Major party candidates who accepted public funding also benefited from provisions
allowing the candidate's national party committee to spend money on behalf of the
candidate. Expenditures on behalf of presidential candidates by recognized party
comminees were limited to $4.6 million, which could be raised from individual
contributions limited to $20,000 a year, and multicandidate committee contributions limited
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to $15.000 a year. Anderson sought 1O get the National Unity Campaign Committee
recognized as a national party committee. which would have allowed it 1O spend as much as
the Democratic and Republican National Committees. However, the FEC denied the
request to recognize the National Unity Campaign Committee as a national parry committee,
because the committee supported no other candidates than Anderson and his running mate
Lucey.t?
As a result of these restraints on his campaign fundraising, Anderson was only able
to raise $17.1 million in total finances to spend before the election, approximately $10
million of which came from private contributions that were subject to limits. The rest of
Anderson's financing came from bank loans secured against (he prospective public
funding, as well as loans solicited in the last days of the campaign from major contributors.
For example. Stewart Mott, a wealthy activist for liberal causes. who had provided funding
for Anderson during the formative stages of his independent effort, extended a $500,000
line of credit to the campaign during the general election. Even with the help of Mort and
other donors, Anderson's $17 million did not even begin to approach the money spent by
the Caner and Reagan campaigns, as the major party candidates outspent Anderson by a
two to one margin. Anderson's finances were further hurt by his need allocate funds to
legal challenges to gain ballot access and federal funding. Because of these barriers
Anderson never had the capital for a competitive campaign, as he could not afford a serious
media campaign. to hire appropriate staff, or fund needed travel.P
The electoral college was another traditional barrier that continued to pose
challenges to nonrnajor party candidates in 1980. Since electoral votes continued. to be
awarded on a winner-take-all basis, the two major parries continued to dominate the
electoral voting. The winner-rake-all provisions also had the usual effect of distorting the
popular vote results. In 19 states, Reagan received less than 50% of the popular vote, yet
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he received all the electoral votes of those states.>' While Anderson received almost 7
percent of the total popular vote, he was not able to win a single state under the winner
take-all provisions, and thus received no electoral college votes .
The winner-take-all provisions also continued to favor single parry domination of
specific states, creating a "lock" or at least a headstart in the college for Republican party
success. In 1980 a number of western states continued the trend of being predisposed

to

vote for the Republicans . The seventeen states west of the Mississippi all voted Republican
in 1980. providing Reagan with 148 electoral votes, of which the first 123 were assured
from states considered uncontestable in 1980.52

In the 1980 election the electoral college continued to support "wasted vote"
concerns among voters. As it became clear near the end of the campaign that Anderson
could not win the necessary electoral college votes, or even a single state, the potential
existed for Anderson voters to be concerned about "wasting" their votes. Anderson had
peaked in the polls with 23 percent in the summer of 1980.53 His support slowly declined
over the fall, and by the final weeks of the campaign Anderson was receiving around 10
percent support in the polls. In the final week before the election, Anderson slipped further
in the polls as he dropped to around 7 percenr.P" As Anderson's support dropped in the
final weeks of the campaign, the Carter campaign acknowledged the imponance of
Anderson's voters, and began to target appeals to them to not waste their vote. 55 The
Carter campaign ran ads and used press conferences to warn against "wasting your vote"
on Anderson. On election day, Anderson took only 6.6 percent of the popular vote, and he
acknowledged that Carter's tactics playing up wasted vote concerns had been "devastating"
to his election day rerurns.s"
51 Wicker, Tom . "A Good Republican College:' The New York Times, November 18. 1980. p. A27.
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54 E1. Dionne. "Poll-Takers Defend Survey Differences." The New York Times. November 6. 1980,

p. A33.
5S Elizabeth Drew, Portrait of an Election: the 1980 Presidential Campaign (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1981), p. 278 .
56 Frank Smallwood, The Other Candidates (Hanover. NH: University Press of New England. 1983).

20
The Anderson campaign proved that the traditional barriers facing nonmajor party
candidates continued to exist in 1980. Anderson faced serious challenges as an
independent candidate trying to qualify for the ballot in all 50 states, challenges that forced
him to invest money and energy that would have been better spent directly competing with
Caner and Reagan. While Anderson's effort to qualify for retroactive public financing as
an independent candidate established a precedent for future independent candidates, the
public financing system continued to provide an overwhelming advantage to the major
party candidates. The electoral college continued to discourage nonrnajor parry candidates
by awarding state votes on a winner-take-all basis. It continued to reward Republican
candidates with a "lock" on the electoral votes of western states, and it distorted the results
of the popular vote. The electoral college also continued to provide basis for "wasted vote"
concerns of many potential nonrnajor party voters.

Nonmajor party activity in the 1968 and 1980 elections was typical not only
because the nonmajor party candidates faced significant structural barriers, but also in that
the movements behind Wallace and Anderson faded after the elections. The declining
presence of Wallace and Anderson was in part because the major parties followed the
traditional wisdom of coopting the alternative candidate's message in order to redistribute
SUPPOTt

back into the major parties.
Nixon effectively coopted Wallace's "law and order" message by 1972, as he

helped pass tough crime legislation such as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 and other legislarion.P By the time Wallace considered another challenge
outside the parties in 1972, he lacked the necessary popular support, even in his southern
stronghold areas. 58 Wallace instead rerurned to the Democratic party and ran as a primary
candidate until an attempt was made on his life in Maryland. Wallace's injuries from the
p. 241.
57 Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery, p. 27.
.
58 Mazrnanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections . pp. 20-24.
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anack forced him to withdraw from the race before the convention. Even if Wallace had
been successful in 1972, it would have been as a major party candidate, not as a challenger
outside the parties. The American Independence Parry had survived without Wallace until
the 1972 election, when the party nominated John Schmitz. Unlike Wallace in the previous
election, the AIP candidate was not a significant factor in the race, and Schmitz received
only 1.4 percent of the popular vote. 59
The 1980 results in both the popular vote and the electoral college limited the role
and influence Anderson could have in politics following the election. With no electoral
college victories Anderson had no geographic strongholds to use

as a foundation for future

political action, and his popular support was insufficient to overcome the perception of a
Reagan landslide in 1980. Following the election, Anderson was criticized for helping to
elect Reagan by stealing Caner's moderate support, a result that Anderson had pledged to
avoid during the campaign. Most of Anderson's voters returned to the major parties
following the election. Reagan's choice of George Bush as his running mate placated
many of the Republican moderates Anderson had counted on for support, and Democrats
could look forward to finding a strong candidate for 1984, no longer obliged to support a
weak incumbent like Caner. 60

The 1992 Election
On February 20, 1992, a relatively unknown Texas billionaire by the name of Ross
Perot appeared on CNN's "Larry King Live" show . During the course of the interview,
which focused primarily on politics and the state of the country, Larry King pressed Perot
about whether he had any intention of joining the presidential race that was then underway.
Perot eventually told King he would consider running as an independent candidate, but
only if volunteers got his name on the ballot in all fifty states. The following day, Perot's
corporate headquarters in Dallas was flooded with more calls than the switchboard could
59
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handle, from volunteers and supporters eager

(0

help get an independent campaign off the

ground. The calls continued to come in during the ensuing weeks and a nationwide
grassroots organization, with a central nexus at on Perot's Dallas headquarters, began to
take shape.s' The extraordinary outpouring of support Perot received was considered
remarkable by the media, and Perot and his campaign began to receive national press
coverage. In many ways, the support for an alternative candidate was not so remarkable,
especially if voter dissatisfaction with the major party candidates in 1992 is considered..

The 1992 Primary Campaign
Americans were upset with the federal government in 1992. In January of 1992 the
Harris Alienation Index, a barometer of public feelings towards the federal government,
reached an all time high as 66 percent of Americans reponed feeling alienated from their
government. The index measured the country's belief in such statements as: "most people
with power try to take advantage of people like yourself," and "the people running the
country don't really care what happens to yoU."62 A January 1992 Roper poll also revealed
a pessimistic national mood, as 70 percent of Americans agreed that the country was "on
the wrong track. "63 The candidates competing in the major party primaries in 1992 were
therefore facing a dissatisfied and skeptical electorate.
The 1992 primary season did little to satisfy the angry electorate. The primaries did
not produce candidates who, in general, satisfied and excited voters. The New Hampshire
primary on February 18 (which was held two days before Perot's first announcement on

"Larry King Live") was an early indicator of the voters' displeasure with the major parties '
candidates. The perceived Democratic frontrunner, Governor Bill Clinton, got off to a
slow primary start, as he secured only 24.7 percent of [he vote against New England local
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Paul Tsongas, who won with 33.2 percent of the vote.v' Incumbent president George
Bush's victory in the Republican primary was only numerical, as challenger Pat Buchanan
and others embarrassed the incumbent by securing 47 percent of the vote. 6S Polls
conducted after the New Hampshire primary indicated that voter dissatisfaction remained
high. On February 20. 1992, the day Perot first announced on "Larry King Live". polls
showed that only 45 percent of voters were satisfied with the field of Democratic
candidates, and only 68 percent were satisfied with the Republican candidates. including
incumbent President Bush. 66 By March 1, 1992, less than a third of all voters considered
either Clinton or Bush close to what they were looking for in a president.s?

As me primary season continued, voter dissatisfaction went beyond the particular
candidates to also encompass the content of the primary campaigns. A Gallup poll reponed
that 42 percent of Americans thought me candidates were not talking about issues they
cared about. Further, 19 percent of potential voters were "undecided " when asked who
they would support in a race between President Bush and "a Democrat. "68 The
dissatisfaction in the electorate during the primaries led to speculation about possible
alternative candidates who might challenge the major party nominees.
While Perot captured the spotlight late in March as a potential alternative candidate
to Clinton and Bush, he was not the sole focus of speculation. During the primaries, there
were some limited efforts to find an alternative from within the parties. For instance,
former Massachusetts senator Paul Tsongas had been pan of the Democratic field during
the early primary campaign. but abandoned the race when his campaign ran into financial
problems. As the primaries continued and it became increasingly clear that Clinton might
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capture the Democratic nomination, a small group organized to collect signatures and raise
funds in an effort to lure Tsongas back into the race. The group, called "Tcirizens for
Tsongas'' believed Tsongas bener embodied the personal character and professionalism of a
Democratic presidential nominee than did Clinton, given Clinton's "slick" professional
style and the many questions about his character. Efforts to get alternatives like Tsongas
into the race were unsuccessful as Clinton and Bush continued to capture delegates and
support from their respective parry organizations.s?
While recognizing the potential for an alternative to Bush and Clinton, Perot was
largely reluctant to join the race , Perot's reluctance was first evident to a number of his
closest advisors and political operatives who had been pressing him since November of
1991 to consider a run for the presidency. Perot had always told them he was not
interested, 70 Even when Perot changed and outwardly began to express an interest in a
possible campaign, he placed a number of conditions on his willingness to run, such as
qualifying for the ballot in all fifty states. When Perot finally offered himself as an
alternative candidate during his February 20 appearance on "Larry King Live," his
reluctance was again apparent as King had
campaign existed. Perot also continued

lO

[0

ask him five times whether a "scenario" for a

emphasize the precondition of full ballot access,

noting "this is all just talk . , . I want to see some sweat ."?' It is also important to note that
Perot's "announcement " on "Larry King Live" did not constitute an official announcement
of his intention to seek the presidency. Perot said "I'm not asking to be drafted," but he
did allow that "if you (the people) want to register me in 50 states, . . I'll promise you this:
Between now

and the convention, we'll get

both parties' heads straighr,'"? Perot did not

give a formal announcement that he was seeking the presidency until his re-entry to the race
over half a year later during the fall general election campaign.
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Perot's reluctance to make himself an alternative candidate continued after his
appearance with Larry King. Despite thousands of calls coming into his Dallas office on a
daily basis, Perot continued

[0

press acquaintances about who might run instead of him.

Fonner senator and Democratic vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen was the only
Democrat on Perot's list, and James Baker the only potential Republican who Perot
respected and could have had a viable chance at winning. Perot understood that neither
Bentsen nor Baker were in any position to launch a bid for the presidency in 1992,73 and
with his own popular support rising, Perot kept developing plans to offer an alternative to
Clinton and Bush. Perot continued making media appearances and eventually pledged to
spend "whatever it takes," even $100 million on his carnpaign.P Perot's willingness to
commit personal funds to a campaign endeavor was a significant sign of his increasing
commitment to the endeavor. His pledge to spend his own money was another aspect of
Perot's lone potential to challenge the parties; only he had the personal financial resources
needed to mount a viable presidential campaign. In other words, while many recognized
the potential for a major party alternative in 1992, few would-he-challengers could have
overcome the traditional barrier of campaign finance. Perot, with his $3 billion in personal
finances, had a unique advantage in having enough money to finance a viable challenge to
the two major parties.

The Traditional Barriers in 1992
Perot's personal wealth was not only his key into the race, but it provided him with
a number of advantages. Perot already had the funds to finance a viable campaign,
meaning he had no need to spend time and energy fundraising. Because Perot did not
have to rely on fundraising from others, he was able to position himself as the only
candidate in the race who was not tied

to

foreign lobbyists or special interests. Perot also
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did not need public financing, and chose not to accept these monies. By not accepting
public funding, Perot was not subject to the FECA limits on expenditures his campaign
could make; he could spend money where, when, and as needed , without worries about
budgeting constraiors." Perot also claimed that, by not taking public financing, he was not
wasting taxpayer dollars on a political campaign, unlike Clinton and Bush. However, the
benefits of funding his own campaign also had their price as the press often questioned
whether Perot was buying the election. Newspaper articles lamented that "the system is for
sale,''76 and charged Perot with furthering the trend of "more and more millionaires rising

from political obscurity to 'buy' elections. out-spending their opponents by ridiculous

margins."?" Perot responded to these charges by acknowledging to his supporters that he
was indeed "buying the election ... I made that deal with you because you can 't afford

it. "78
Perot's tremendous wealth helped him overcome the traditional barrier of ballot
access. Unlike Wallace and Anderson, who each had to designate significant amounts of
their campaign's resources to qualify on the ballot in all fifty Slates, Perot was able to
finance a ballot access drive without compromising the financing of the rest of his
campaign. Yet despite this financial advantage, he still faced significant hurdles in gaining
access to the ballot. In fact, the challenge of gaining nationwide ballot access was one of
Perot's early concerns as he considered an independent candidacy. John Jay Hooker, a
Tennessee businessman who had been crying to persuade Perot to run, had to first convince
him it was logistically possible. Hooker got an affirmative answer from Richard Winger, a
specialist on the state by state ballot access rules ."? It was only after Winger's assurance
early in the primary season that it would be possible to qualify on every state's ballot that
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Perot communicated his willingness to run, with the condition that supporters organize a
drive to put him on the ballot in all fifty st1ues.so
Perot had an easier time qualifying for the ballot than Anderson had, due to a
number of changes had occurred in state ballot access requirements between 1980 and

1992. Twelve states had changed their deadlines for when candidates needed to file in
order 1O appear on the ballot. Of the twelve, only Indiana and Washington had moved their
deadlines to earlier dates. This made it harder for candidates to qualify, because, as
Anderson had argued in 1980, independent candidates often don't decide on a challenge
until after the major parties have determined their nominees. Ten other states made their
ballot access procedures more accessible. Nine states made their filing dares later (NY, MI,
NJ, MA, PA, WV, OR, RI, SD), and Wyoming, which had no qualifying procedure in
1980, adopted one with an August 24 deadline."
Deadlines are not the only important aspect in determining the restrictivness of a
state's ballot access procedure. Another important aspect is the number of signatures a
state requires on ballot access petitions, and the provisions governing how these signatures
are gathered. Twenty states had changed the signature requirements associated with ballot
access. Seven of these made it more difficult for candidates by requiring a greater number
of signatures (NC, MI, CO, NH, ND, AL, IN). Ten states required fewer signatures (NV,
GA, MA , AK, OR, ID, KS, NY, SD), and three others states changed signature rules in
non-quantitative manners . Maine began to require that petition signers must be registered
members of the party, making it harder for signature gatherers. Virginia began

[0

require

that signature gatherers only distribute petitions in their home districts Gater amended to
allow gathering in neighboring districts as well).82 Lastly, Wyoming's new procedure
required 8,000 signatures that represented 3.6 percent of [he voting populace, among the
highest percentage required in the country.P
S(llbid., pp. 419-423.
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The daunting task of gathering around 732,000 signatures nationwide was further
complicated by measures in certain states. Texas, Nebraska, West Virginia, and Arizona
all required petition signers to have not voted in the major parties' primaries.e' Maine

required 4,000 signatures, but did not allow more than 6,000 to be submitted.P making it
hard to insure against invalid signatures by entering extras. Hawaii required only 4,200

signatures, but they had to be in black ink.86 New York remained one of the more fickle
states regarding nonmajor party candidate ballot access. In New York, state Republican
leaders displayed openly hostile feelings towards Perot's candidacy.F volunteers could
only begin circulating petitions on July 7, five weeks before the filing deadline . The
signatures had to include 100 from 17 of the state's 34 congressional districts, and signers
could not have signed petitions for major party convention delegates.P
An additional requirement in 37 states required independent candidates to list a vice
presidential candidate when filing.89 To comply, Ross Perot chose Admiral James
Stockdale on March 30 as a temporary running mate for the Spring of 1992. Perot named
Stockdale solely in order to qualify for ballot access, and intended to replace him with a
permanent running mate before the major parties conventions.?" However, Perot dropped
out of the race before naming a replacement running mate, making Stockdale the de facto
vice presidential nominee in the fall due to Perot's late reentry to the race.
The Perot campaign also faced a number of non-traditional barriers while trying to
gain ballot access. In Nonh Carolina, two men wearing Perot campaign pins entered a
volunteer office and arternpted to "pick up" signed petitions, only for it to be discovered
they were "impostors." A businessman, also in North Carolina, claimed that Democratic
state inspectors had threatened to "shut him down" if he signed petitions. In Maryland,
S4 "Perot's Hope: More Than 767,000 Signatures," SI. Petersburg Times , April 5, 1992 , p. 6A .
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volunteer's efforts were "bedeviled." by a number of forged signatures. Lastly, in the
Florida Keys, "bogus petitions" were being circulated. that did not comply with strict
Florida regulations that petitions be in both English and Spanish.?'
The campaign finance barriers faced by non major party candidates had not changed
since John Anderson's campaign in 1980. In 1992, the FECA limits on contributions
remained at $1,000 for individuals, and $5 ,000 for multicandidate committees. Public
financing provided each major party candidate in 1992 with up to $13.8 million in matching
funds during the prenomination campaign, and $55.2 million for the general election. It
provided each major party with $11 million for its nominating convention and permitted
national parry organizations to each spend $10.3 million on their respective presidential

candidate.i? While Anderson had set the precedent in 1980 for independent candidates to
qualify for retroactive public financing, the rules governing this funding had not changed.
Nonmajor party candidates could still only qualify for post-election funding based on a
proportionate share. Given the limited public money available, Perot decided to sidestep
the restrictions that would accompany the acceptance of public financing, and rely instead
on his sizable personal fortune.

Perot did not rely solely on his own personal finances to fund the campaign. He

also invited supporters to contribute $5 if they wanted to have "skin in the game."93 While
individual contributions (not all in the amount of $5) to the campaign totaled about $5
million, they were a small sum when compared with the $63.3 million Perot spent from his
own fortune.v' which constituted the largest contribution by a single person to a political
campaign in American history.95 The total expenditure of $68.4 million by the Perot
campaign is reasonably close to the amounts spent by the Clinton and Bush campaigns.
However, when party spending on behalf of the Clinton and Bush campaigns is taken into
9t Robinson, "Perot Faces Obstacles in Ballot Access:'
92 Alexander and Corrado, Financing the 1992 Election, p. 22.
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account. Perot's $68.4 total expenditure pales in comparison with the nearly $90 million
spent by or for Bush, and the $130 million spent by or for Clinton.w
During the initial campaign from February to July. Perot spent over $12 million of
his own money, and an additional $2.5 million from outside contributions. Most of this

was spent on ballot access costs.?' The extensive media exposure Perot received. which
fueled his rise to the tOP of the polls from mid-March into July,98 was essentially free, since
during this period Perot relied on talk shows and news coverage to spread his message.
Although he dropped out of the race in July, Perot continued to spend money on ballot
access between July and October. To keep his petition drive alive in California, he at times
spent $40,000 a month, and at one point $480,000 a month nationwide to keep offices
open in all fifty stares.P?
Perot spent the bulk of his money after returning to the race on October 1, and
most of it was spent on media. Perot spent $10.8 million in the first ten days of

October.Pl By the end of the month he spent $31.9 million on television advertising, A
final two hour media blitz on election eve, split between the three major networks, cost
Perot $3.2 million.l?' Perot's ability to finance these expenditures set him apart from
previous non major party candidates. Where previous non major parry candidates had
struggled to gain any media exposure, Perot was able to buy large blocks of television time
to communicate with voters.
The electoral college continued to present a formidable challenge to nonmajor party
candidates in 1992. Like previous independent and third party challengers, Perot had to
compete under the winner-take-all provisions. As a result, although he won 19 percent of
the popular vote, Perot did not receive a single electoral college vote. Perot beat Clinton in
Utah. and he topped Bush in Maine, where he came close to capturing electoral votes under
96 Ibid.. p. 115.
97 Ibid., pp. 130-132.
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Maine's district vote system. Perot beat Bush in Maine by 316 votes, and he only lost to
Clinton by 56,600 votes (about 8 percent). Yet, even with this good. showing, Perot did
not receive any electoral college support.F'
Although Perot did not win any electoral college votes, he did have an impact on the
electoral college voting in the election. Clinton's electoral college success in 1992 was in
no small part the result of Ross Perot's candidacy , Perot provided a significant third choice
for voters in aU fifty states. His presence created a three-way race that allowed Clinton to
win the electoral college vote in a number of states with less than 50 percent support. Of
the 32 states Clinton won in the electoral college, he received a majority of the popular vote
in only his home state of Arkansas and Washington, D.C. Clinton won 13 other states
with more than 45 percent of the vote, which still would have left him 66 electoral college
votes short of victory. Clinton's victory was dependent upon 14 states he won with 40 -45
percent of the vote, and four other states he won with less than 40 percent of the popular
vote. I03 Perot received most of his support in western states formerly dominated by the
Republicans, as well as in New England . Perot's support in Republican controlled western 
states divided the Republican vote, depriving Bush of his needed electoral base, and
allowing Clinton to win these states.P'
Republicans in previous elections had enjoyed a head-stan of around 100 electoral
votes from heavily Republican western Slates. Of the 32 states Clinton won, twenty broke

from their Republican voting trends. Eight had not voted for a Democratic presidential
candidate since 1976, three more since 1968, and nine others, including electoral college
giant California, that had last supported a Democratic nominee in 1964.\05 Clinton's
presidential advisor, James Carville, was careful to note following the election that the
Democrats had merely "picked the electoral lock, we didn't find the keys to it"l06 In other
Pomper. The Election of 1992. pp, 136-137.
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words, the Democrats had been able to assemble a winning electoral college block of states,
but could not rely on this coalition in the future.
Whether Perot was affected by strategic voting concerns, or the "wasted vote"
syndrome, is unclear. When Perot re-entered the race on October 1, polls showed him
with 7 percent support. Over the next four weeks his suppon in Newsweek's
"Banleground '92" tracking poll continuously climbed. The week before the election this
poll indicated that Perot was receiving between 17 and 19 percent of the potential vote. The
19 percent of the popular vote that Perot received on election day matched these polling
results. This would seem to indicate that Perot did not suffer from "wasted vote" concerns
on election day, or in the weeks leading up to the election. This conclusion, however, is
challenged by other studies that suggested significant evidence of strategic voting behavior
and "wasted vote" concerns among voters. Studies conducted before the election showed
tbat when potential voters were asked not to take concerns about Perot's actual chance of
winning the election into account, 38 percent said they would support PereL 10? Because
Perot only received 19 percent of the popular vote on election day, it appears that a large
number of voters made strategic decisions not to vote for Perot because they believed he
could not win.
Regardless of whether Perot actually suffered from the "wasted vote" syndrome on
election day, both Clinton and Bush tried to capitalize on potential "wasted vote" concerns
in the weeks leading lip to the election. The major party candidates aired ads and made

addresses in the final weeks of the campaign urging Perot supporters not to waste their vote
on a candidate cenain to lose. lOS Perot countered these charges by claiming Bush
supporters were the ones wasting their vote "because he can't

win"l09

and by urging voters

not to waste their vote "on politics as usual."IIO
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Theodore Lowi and Third Party Politics
Political scientist Theodore Lowi has recently focused parts of his writing on
championing a role for third parties in America. Lowi believes that the two parry system is
responsible for a number of the problems currently plaguing American politics and
government, and that third parties are just what the American political system needs. In his
view, the two party system was able to provide political solutions for the problems of the
country until the mid-twentieth century. However, in the decades after the New Deal, as
the federal government began its dramatic growth , battles over policy became increasingly
ideological. These "ideological conflicts began to emerge more starkly"!'! in the early
1970's with the partisan emphasis on "wedge issues". "Wedge issues" are issues such as
crime, welfare, taxes, social and economic regulation, where specific stances adopted by
the parties would be sure

(0

alienate certain blocks of voters. The purpose of "wedge

issues" is to drive a wedge into the opposing party's coalition, dividing an opponent's
support, and forcing an opponent (0 alienate a group of voters. As the major parties began
to define their ideological stances on "wedge issues" they alienated blocks of voters, an
experience which Lowi claims has immobilized "party leadership, and once parties are
immobilized the government itself is immobilized."\12 Parries and candidates are
immobilized by "wedge issues" because they fear taking a firm stance one way or another
on such issues will alienate some crucial block of voters from their coalition. Therefore,
the result of the ideological battles over "wedge issues" has been a tendency for the major
parties to shy away from taking stands on issues that would likely alienate blocks of voters.
The effectiveness of the federal government has been compromised by the parties'
acceptance of this immobilized state.
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An immobilized government is a government of "gridlock." Lowi contends this
state of gridlock is acceptable to both parries because each parry in effect has become a
"majority party." Each party has had control of at least one branch of government for most
of the last forty years. As majority parties, there is little incentive for either parry to define
its issue stances and decide "major policy issues in the voting booth," because doing so
would risk losing the party's share of control in the government. Funher, neither parry
needs to open itself up to new interests. Only a defeated parry has an incentive to define its
stance on issues and open itself up to new supporters in an attempt to create a broader base
of support for the future. I 13 The establishment of the two parties as permanent fixtures of
the system has allowed them to construct significant barriers to non-major parry
challengers. Lowi notes that the parties have created barriers to ballot access and campaign
finance that support the two party system, a system "which would collapse in an instant if
the tubes were pulled and the IV's were cut." 114

Lowi notes that third parties in the American political system have historically been
single issue movements. Third panies (or independents) have entered the political fray CO
highlight a particular issue nor being addressed by the major parties. Success for third
parries and independent candidates therefore depends on their willingness to adopt defined
positions on issues the major parties fail to address. Issue-driven candidacies derive their
support from constituencies that value the position taken by the candidate. In some
instances such candidates have served to stimulate the interest of disenfranchised voters and
thereby provided these individuals with a way back into the political process by adopting
issue stances neglected by the major parries. The 1968 Wallace campaign provides an
example of a successful issue-driven third party candidacy. Wallace entered the race as a
third party candidate with specific stances on civil rights and Vietnam which the major
parries had not adopted. For instance, Wallace's position to stay and fight in Vietnam was
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shared by nearly a third of Americans, lIS while Nixon and Humphrey both favored
withdrawal. Nixon and Humphrey favored an end to segregation; only Wallace
represented approximately 15 percent of Americans who favored continuing segregation. 116
Wallace derived SupPOTt from these voters alienated by the major party candidates'
positions.
According to Lowi, the Perot candidacy of 1992 differed from earlier non major
party candidacies because Perot's support was not based upon his position on any single
issue, but rather on a constiruency unhappy with the two parties and their handling of
government in genera1. Indeed, while Perot often defined his candidacy by focusing on the
issue of the deficit, his support was not limited to this issue. Rather his appeal was
founded on his status as a "political outsider" nor associated with the two major parties. By
1992 Americans felt increasingly alienated from and unhappy with "Washington
politicians," creating "a near collapse in public confidence and support for the president,
Congress, both political parries, and for nearly everyone else involved in the political
system. "117 The discontent voters felt towards established politicians in Washington
translated into their willingness to accept new alternatives. Lowi cites polls conducted in
the spring of 1992 that showed that 60 percent of American voters favored the formation of
a third party as an alternative to the Democrats and Republicans . Voters were so interested
in a third option, Lowi contends, that even Ross Perot's "ill -defined alternative to the
established parties" was able to generate a "remarkable outburst of enthusiasm.t'U''
Political scientist Howard Gold has done research that further supports Lowi's
contention regarding Perot's support. Gold investigated whether systematic explanations
for third party success could help explain factors that were critical to Perot's results in
1992. While Gold concluded that Perot's success was primarily due to idiosyncratic
factors, most importantly his ability to finance a campaign with his personal fortune, he
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also notes that one systematic factor was significant in explaining Perot's success. This
factor was "an electorate with weak partisanship."!'? Gold's assertion that the 1992
electorate displayed weak: partisanship supports Lowi's assertion that Americans were
dissatisfied with the major parties and wanted a third alternative.
Gold's research thus affirms Lowi's view [hat Perot's support was not grounded in
issues. According to Gold, only 14 percent of Perot's supporters "identified an issue-based
reason for supporting their candidate."I20 He funher notes that while factors including the
electorate's "assessments of the (major party] candidates, distrust toward government, and
issue awareness - were significant [factors in Perot's support] but their effects were
generally small by recent historical standards."121 In other words, these systematic factors
contributed. to Perot's support, but when compared with the elections of 1968 and 1980,
which also involved notable nonmajor party challengers, they were a less important factor
for Perot than they were for Wallace or Anderson . Gold concludes that "the level of
negativity/neutrality towards the parties. although stable, was high in 1992"122 compared to
recent elections. Gold proves that there was a stronger relationship between partisanship
and vote choice in 1992 than there was in 1968 or 1980, a fact which supports "the notion
that the presence of a large base of nonpartisan citizens underlay Perot's success." 123
Lowi regards the 1992 campaign as a potential "beginning of the end of America's
two parry system," but he is careful to note his skepticism as to whether Perot himself will
be able to establish a genuine third party . Lowi has described Perot as "just another pretty
face" on the political scene and as an "Opera Buffa Dictator" who believes in top-down
control of a party. Lowi thus emphasizes Perot's supporters as the foundation for a
potential new party, rather than Perot himself. He sees the extraordinary ourpouring of
support for Perot as an indicator that Americans "have grasped the essential point that the
119 Howard Gold, "Third
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current incumbents will not, and cannot, reform a system that drastically needs
overhauling."124 He concludes that electoral "conditions for a third pany have rarely been
more favorable ."1l5
With the current political climate being so conducive for forming a third parry, Lowi
has outlined five guidelines towards building a genuine and successful third party in the
aftermath of 1992. These guidelines state that the party should:

• be built bottom-up, based on grass roots initiatives,
• be opportunistic, with a focus towards winning elections,
• run candidates at all levels of government, not just for president,
• cross-endorse other parties' candidates,
• have organization to last beyond one election.Fs
For Lowi, building a third parry based on grass roots initiatives is vital because one of the
benefits third parties offer the political system is increased citizen participation in politics.
By championing issues of interest
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voters that have been neglected by the major parties,

third parties offer disenfranchised voters a reason to return to the system. But as Lowi

notes, "more than that, there is an enthusiasm about an emerging party that inspires people
to come out from their private lives and to convert their civic activity to political activity,"
drawing people beyond voting to become "petition gatherers, door knockers, envelope
tickers and $5 contributors .. . an anecdote to the mass politics."127 It is a simple fact that

in order to remain viable and secure a place in the system, third parties have to focus on
winning elections. Lowi notes that candidacies for a single office, like Ross Perot's bid for
the presidency in 1992, are not anything like a real third party. "A genuine third parry is
just like the two major parties,"128 running people at all levels of office from local to
national. The party could help establish itself by cross-endorsing selected candidates from
124 Lowi,
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the other major parties who seek to promote ideals similar to its own . Cross-endorsing
could also raise the party's public visibility by providing the party an opportunity to be
associated with major parry candidates in an election. Finally , Lowi notes that organization
to last beyond a single election cycle is the important first step towards "running candidates
for office in every election [which] is the only way to secure organizational integrity."I29

Lowi contends that Ross Perot is not the figure who can or will implement these
guidelines to

[01111

a genuine third party that could change the political system. Lowi is also

skeptical about the chances for the establishment of a third party without Perot as the
champion for the alternative to the major parties. Lowi examines the potential for others
like Colin Powell, Jesse Jackson, Lowell Weicker, or Bill Bradley, all of whom have been
the subject of speculation for their potential to raise a third party, and summarily rejects
each for their lack of political understanding or their fatal ties
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the major parties. While

Lowi does not recognize anyone with the potential to lead a third party movement, he
regards Perot's supporters in 1992 and the other American voters eager for an alternative to
the major parties as the important building block for a potential third parry.

The Perot VQter
The results on Election Day in 1992 provided a surprise to many political scientists
as voter participation increased to 55 percent, ending a thirty year decline. This increase in
the vote was in large part a result of Perot's candidacy. That eligible voters who had not
voted in previous elections were drawn to the polls by the Perot option is confirmed by the
fact that "the Democratic share of the eligible vote rose very slightly, while the Republican
share declined, suggesting that

Mr. Perot caused the overall increase in turnout. "130 Exit

polls confirmed the impact Perot had on increasing voter turnout, as 14 percent of Perot's
voters said they would not have voted if he had not been on the ballot.P' The 14 percent of
129 Lowi , "The Party Crasher," p. 33.
130 Robert Pear, "55% Voting Rate Reverses 30-Year Decline:' The New York Times. November 5. 1992,
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Perot voters who otherwise would not have voted constitutes 2.8 million Americans, or 1.5
percent of the total electorate in 1992. Since total turnout rose by 5. I percent in 1992,
Perot was directly responsible for almost 30 percent of me increased turnout 132
These turnout figures do not take into account me more general impact the Perot
candidacy had on the election. Perot's candidacy increased public interest in the election,
and generated more media coverage of the election. The increased media coverage of the
campaign was supplemented by the $60 million Perot spent on television, giving the 1992
election the most paid media in history.P" Further, Perot's strong showing in the debates
hurt Clinton's popular support in the closing weeks of the campaign, creating the
perception among voters that the race was getting closer. 134 Close elections stimulate voter
participation because voters are more apt to consider their vote as having some effect in
determining the results. In fact, according to voters, the number one reason for voter
decline in the elections from 1960 through 1972, was that the races were not close.P> The
electorate took great interest in the 1992 race, as 78 percent of voters found the election
interesting, and only 17 percent found the election dull. This interest was remarkably
higher than the 1988 race, where 42 percent of voters found the election interesting, and 52
percent found it dull. l36
Surveys and exit polls conducted on election day in 1992 provide a host of
information about the demographics of Perot's supporters , as well as insights into their
motivation for supporting him. Exit polls revealed, not surprisingly, that Perot's suppon
was greatest among voters who identified themselves as Independems. He received 30
percent of the Independent vote, as compared
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17 percent of the vote from self-identified

Republicans and 13 percent from voters identifying themselves as Democrats. He also
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received greater support from moderates (21 percent of the moderate vote) than from
liberals (18 percent of the liberal vote) or conservatives (18 percent of the conservative
vote). Perot did substantially better with white voters (94 percent of his support) than with
minorities, a fact that in part explains why he fared better in the West and Northeast of the
country, and received little support in the South. Perot appealed to middle class voters,
received more support from men than women, and appealed most to voters younger than

45. 137
What defined Perot voters most was their anger at the government and the major
parties. Perot's supporters were at the forefront of the "mad as hell" voting movement of
1992, with 88 percent of this group indicating they were angry or dissatisfied with the
government (compared with 74 percent of all voters). Frustration with the way
government had been working led 69 percent of Perot's voters to agree that "government
would work better if all new people" were elected in 1992 (only 49 percent of all voters
agreed). This sentiment was so strong that it led most Perot voters (89 percent) to support
congressional term limits.l3& Voter anger with the government was also directed towards
the role and influence of special interests in Washington. Perot supporters (81 percent)
were more inclined than voters overall (68 percent) to believe that lobbyists had "a great
deal" of influence. Such an inclination helps explain their SUppOTt for campaign finance
reform, that would limit the role of special interests in elections.P?
Voter anger in 1992 extended past the government to the political parties
themselves. A poll conducted in May of 1992 by Gordon and Benjamin Black showed that
59 percent of voters were "angry" or "dissatisfied" with the Democratic party, and 60
percent felt that same way about the Republicans. 140 Similarly, a Harris poll conducted in
July of 1992 found that 59 percent of adults thought the two party system was not serving
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the country well.r" Gordon and Benjamin Black contend that this discontent can be
attributed to the behavior of the major parties, which were violating the principles of two
party government. Instead of having parties "converge to the center" in order to attract

centrist voters who are ideologically in the middle of two parties, the major parties instead
became responsive to "a coalition of activists" that drive party positions to the fringes of the
political spectrum, away from the majority of voters. Black uses the example of the
Republican parry and its position on abortion in the 1992 election to illustrate this point.
The Republican party succumbed to pressure from conservatives and approved a plank
regarding abortion at their convention even though only 9 percent of Americans agreed with
it. 142
This dissatisfaction and anger with the major parties played a significant role in
Perot's support. Almost 35 percent of Perot's supponers fostered negative feelings
towards both of the major parties in 1992 . This is significantly higher than the 13.2
percent of Anderson supporters who disliked both parties in 1980, or even the 23.4 percent
of Wallace supporters who disliked both of the major parties in 1968 . 143 Weak
partisanship caused by dissatisfaction with the parties was evident in 1992, and influenced
nonmajor party support to a greater degree than it did in 1968 or in 1980 . According to
Gold, 13.1 percent of voters who identified themselves as being "strong/weak" partisans
(rather than "Independent/leaner") in 1992 supported Perot, while the similar group of
party identifiers had only given Wallace 9.1 percent, and Anderson received only 5.7
percent from the same group. 144
Dissatisfaction with the major parties was also fueled by "neutral" feelings toward
the parties, by a belief that there were very few differences between them. Gold, for
example, found that 31.6 percent of the electorate had neutral feelings towards the parties in
1992, and that 22 percent of Perm's supporters harbored such feelings towards the
Ibid., p. 154.
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parties. 14S Neutral feelings were also manifest in voters' belief that there were few
differences between the parties. A Center for Political Studies sample cited by Gold shows
that 40 percent of Americans "could not articulate an important difference between the two
parries and 49 percent believed that there was no difference between the parties' respective
abilities to solve pressing problems. "146
Another theme that appealed and motivated Perot's supporters was his conservative
economic tough talk about the national debt and the economy. Perot voters
overwhelmingly (89 percent) thought the nation's economy was "not so good" or "poor."
While voters overall echoed this sentiment, they were not as emphatic about the depth of
the decline, or the duration. Perot had focused the majority of his campaign rhetoric on the
issue of the national debt, and many voters shared his view as to the importance of this
issue. Exit polling revealed voters in 1992 were most concerned about the economy (42
percent) and the federal deficit (21 percent), beating om health care (20 percent) which was
touted by Clinton, and family values (15 percent) which were a cornerstone of the Bush
campaign. But the deficit was the most important issue to Perot voters, as 65 percent
indicated they believed reducing the budget deficit should be the highest priority for the
next president (only 54 percent of all voters considered it me top priority). Perot voters
favored a conservative approach towards downsizing government and controlling the
deficit. Reducing government spending on services was more important than decreasing
taxes to Perot voters, as only 11 percent cited cutting taxes as the number one priority for
the president in the next four years . In fact, while still citing the need for greater spending
cuts by the federal government, Perot voters indicated in exit polls they would be open to
specific taxes
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fund a national health care plan . 147

A final common sentiment of Perot voters was a liberal stance on some social
issues, particularly towards government involvement in such issues as abortion and
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restrictions on gay service in the military. Almost half of Perot voters favored allowing
openly gay service in the military, while 65 percent did not think abortion should be
illegal,148 and only 5 percent considered it an important issue in deciding how to vote. 149
According to Everett Carll Ladd another indicator of the groups' "libertarian inclinations"
on social and value issues, is that they are less active in attending religious services (only

33 percent attended religious services on a weekly basis, compared with 42 percent of all
voters who did).150 However, Ladd carefully notes an insight to this information on Perot
voter's social beliefs, as he explains "the Perot electorate was not looking for 'new values';
they just were not greatly interested in the values issues, which left them open to suasion
on the economic dimension.T"
Ross Perot's supporters had more in common with Republicans than Democrats, a
fact which hurt President Bush . Perot voters had shown Republican tendencies in the 1988
presidential contest they favored Bush by a 56 percent to 17 percent margin over Democrat
Michael Dukakis, a greater margin than the overall electorate (53 percent Bush, 27 percent
Dukakis).152 More importantly, Perot cut into the traditional demographic support groups

-prirnarily white, western, males- that Republican presidential candidates had counted on
since 1972. More voters who identified themselves as Republicans voted for Perot than
did identified Democrats, meaning Bush lost more of his own party's faithful

to

Perot than

did the Democrats. Perot further undermined Bush's support by depriving him of the
Republican's customary share of the independent vote. Identified independents have
favored the Republican presidential candidate since the 1930's, with the exception of the
Johnson 1964 landslide. However, in 1992 Clinton (38 percent) secured more of the
Independent vote than Bush (32 percent), primarily because Bush split his share with Perot

(30 percent). Finally, the Republican tendencies of Perot voters were apparent in the
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shared ideologies on general issues, such as the role of government (less government
services, less taxes). 153 While Perot voters deserted the Republicans and hurt Bush in
1992, the GOP enjoyed an advantage after the election when attempting to coopt and appeal
to Perot Voters.

After the 1992 EJection
After 1992, a number of questions existed about the future of Ross Perot and his
supporters. Would Perot and his followers become a permanent political force in elections
to come and thus buck the historical trend of fading into obscurity following the election?
Would Ross Perot be willing to continue using his personal wealth to finance a political
organization, and were his supporters unified enough behind Perot or a set of principles to
remain a cohesive voting block? Would the major panies co-Opt the reform message Perot
had espoused throughout the 1992 campaign? Would the "mad as hell" voters remain
angry and continue to be open to alternative candidates who attacked politics as usual?
Perot had a major impact on the 1992 election, but it was not clear whether he and the
alienated American voters would continue to have an impact on the political process.
Nonmajor parry challengers have historically disappeared from the political scene
following an election. After capturing nearly 28 percent of the vote with his Bull Moose
Party in the 1912 presidential election, Theodore Roosevelt retired from politics and headed
south to Brazil to collect plane and animal samples for the American Museum of Natural
History.P' John Anderson had a similar experience following his failed bid in 1980. After
the election he delivered lectures across the country and began work in Chicago as a
television commentator. He was a political entity of interest, but certainly not of any
clout 155 George Wallace faded more slowly following the 1968 election, maintaining
enough of a profile to consider another challenge in 1972. But, popular support in key
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southern states had dissipated by 1972and Wallace decided against mounting another
challenge to the major parties in 1972, instead entering the Democratic primaries.Ps

In the immediate aftermath of the 1992 election, many political scientists were quick
to dismiss Perot and the impact he might have on politics, and wrote him off as another

challenger headed for political obscurity. According to Nelson Polsby, Perot's campaign
was little more than "an ego trip by a very superficial person.?"? Theodore Lowi
contended that Perot was in the position to funher direct the political process towards a real
alternative to the major parties, but that Perot was not personally inclined to such a pursuit

Lowi noted that historically "Perot will never be more than an asterisk as an
independent."158 Lowi believed Perot would join the ranks of nonmajor party candidates
who faded into obscurity after a single election ,
However, on ejection night 1992, before the results were even final, Perot was
already pledging to keep his movement, and his own political future, alive. He told
supporters, "We'll keep this going as long as you want to keep it going, "159 A number of
factors combined to help Perot fulfill his promise of continued political activity. Whereas
previous candidates had faded into obscurity following elections, factors such as Perot's
wealth and the public openness towards political figures outside the major parties were an
initial pan of his insurance against a similar political fate. Perot's offer to fund UWSA
indefinitely was another example of his continued personal commitment to government
reform, and also of the unique financial advantage he enjoyed with his multi-billion dollar
bank account.
Perot's 19 percent of the popular vote provided a further foundation for him to
remain politically active, as he was perceived as having political clout Americans
identified Perot as the individual championing government reform, and voters had a more
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favorable view of Perot once they were not considering him as a presidential candidate, as
is evident by his popularity actually improving following the election. Over the final week
of the campaign his favorabiliry ratings ranged from being slightly unfavorable (44/46) , to
equal (45/45), to positive (50/40). By January 1993, Perot's support had skyrocketed,
and the percentage of American's who had a favorable view of him had improved to a two
to one margin. 1lil Evidence of voter's concerns wi th Perot as a candidate can also be found

in polling conducted during October which showed that Perot was considered presidential
material by only 21 percent of voters.w' Similar concerns were evident from viewer's
reactions to the presidential debates, as many voters expressed reservations about whether
Perot was presidential material. 162 As his popularity strengthened following the election,
Perot was quick to employ his political clout by reorganizing his UWSA support
organi union.
The continued development of Perot's organization United We Stand America
assured that Perot and his supporters would have a vehicle for continued activity between
elections. Perot announced his intention to continue developing UWSA formally on
January 11, 1993. saying "We want ro be a constructive, positive force to give the people
in this country a voice and to, in every possible way, eliminate and the diminish the
effectiveness of the special interests and the [obbyistS."l63 In the following months, he
toured the country promoting the organization and recruiting new members. Membership
information has not been released by Perot, bur estimates put the group at well over one
million members.P' The initial membership drive spearheaded by Perot in the Spring of

1993 netted at least $15 million from individual memberships at $15 a piece. Such a
financial feat underscored the greater impact of Perot and his movement, as the Democratic
National Committee took over two years to raise the same amount under the Bush
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administrarion .ts! Perot reportedly was still content to fund UWSA operations despite this
fundraising success, and simply deposited the money raised to be used for future UWSA
activities. 166
While the role of UWSA was never specifically outlined, it was assumed that the
organization would serve as a citizens' watchdog over the major parties' actions in
Washington, particularly on issues concerning the deficit, campaign finance reform, and
restrictions on lobbyists and government perks.V? Perot hinted at such a role when he told
supporters "you gave Washington a laser-like message to listen to the people,"I68 a
message to which UWSA and Perot would help hold the panies accountable.
While Perot denied that UWSA was being created with third parry ambitions in
mind, the organization did meet one of Lowi's criteria for the creation of a new party: that
an organization be maintained beyond a single election. United We Stand America was
organized with a national headquarters in Dallas, and state and local chapters across the rest
of the nation. The organization provided a formal apparatus for Perot and his supporters to
stay involved in the political process following the 1992 election, an important first step
towards keeping options open for future action, including the possibility of forming a third
parry.

The NAFTA Debate

Perot was not alone in realizing the strong message for change the 1992 election
had sent to politicians in Washington . As the Clinton administration began a four year term,
they focused on showing progress in breaking the gridlock on issues like the deficit and
campaign finance reform, while at the same time looking for ways to stifle the role Perot
could continue to play in politics.
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Following the 1992 election, President Clinton focused his legislative agenda on
major reforms including a reinvention of the welfare system, developing a comprehensive
national health-care system, and reviving a sluggish economy. Before Clinton could act on
these major reforms he had to first deal with the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) that had been negotiated by his predecessor, President George Bush. Clinton's

policy advisors told the president that the potential for later reforms depended on the
president's success at getting NABA approved.Is?
The NAFTA proposal sought to establish a free trade area among the Nonh
American countries of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. The general objectives
included an elimination or relaxation of barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, in order
to make it easier to trade goods across the borders of these three countries. NAnA also

sought to promote fair trade among the three countries, increase investment opportunities,
and provide better protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. no While the
agreement seemed like a good proposal in spirit, many Americans worried that changes to
America's trade policy would cause American companies to relocate to Canada or Mexico,
costing Americans jobs. Despite the support of former president Bush and the Clinton
administration, NAFTA was a very controversial issue in 1993 and was not assured of
passage.
Clinton's prospects of securing congressional approval for the controversial
NAFfA proposal were jeopardized by the efforts of Ross Perot. Perot had opposed
NAFTA throughout the election, noting his belief that the agreement would cost Americans
thousands of jobs. which would go to Mexico with a "giant sucking sound. "l1l When the
Senate debate on the agreement began in the Fall of 1993, Perot seized the opportunity to
playa role in opposing NAFTA after the election. Perot wrote a best-selling book outlining
169 William Neikirk, "Clinton's Big Plans Await Griuy Reality," Chicago Tribune, September 12, 1993.
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the potential harms of the proposed trade agreement entitled: Save Your Job. Save our
CountrY: Why NAFTA Must be StoDDed--NowL Throughout 1993 Perot also toured the
country to hold over 90 rallies against NAFrA. Perot made television appearances on

shows including "Larry King Live,"112 and he produced

two

30 -minute infomercials

opposing the trade agreement. 173 Because of all this work, Perot came to be recognized as
the leader of the NAFTA opposition.
The Clinton administration recognized that Perot could continue to playa role in
politics following the 1992 election. Bur the Clinton administration also recognized that
they needed to limit Perot's role and clout since he threatened to be a significant critic-at
large who could forcefully oppose the new administration. During the campaign and in the
early months of the administration, Clinton did not actively challenge or oppose Perot. for
fear of alienating the 19 million voters who had supported Perot in 1992}74 However, in
the weeks leading up to the NAFTA vote, it became clear the agreement's passage was in
jeopardy, and that Clinton's future policy initiatives were also jeopardized if NAFrA did
not pass. Because of the necessity to pass NAFTA, the Clinton administration made the
decision to recognize Perot as the head of the NAFTA opposition and attack him.
Prior to attacking Perot on NAFTA , the Administration had gathered polling data on
Perot and his supporters looking for "an opportunity to damage" Perot without alienating
his supporters. 115 Clinton's staff found [hat Perot 's supporters identified Perot as "a
political reformer," and that "issues like the North American Free Trade Agreement
[NAFTA 1" were not the kinds of issues supporters used to identify with Perot The
administration thus "made a strategic decision to engage Perot in some way ... before the
NAFTA debate was over."176 The White House decision to engage Perot personally was
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further bolstered by Perot's steady decline in opinion polls during 1993. According to a
New York Times/CBS News Poll Perot's favorability had dropped to 34 percent by mid
September of 1993. 111
The Clinton administration therefore adopted a twofold strategy regarding Perot and
NAFTA: (1) to discredit and diminish the role Perot could play in politics, and (2) to use
attacks against Perot as a foundation for turning the NAFTA debate around. Clinton
sought to isolate Perot as the "one volatile villain" heading the opposition to NABA

178

As White House officials noted, "The more the face of anti-NAFfA is Ross Perot, the
better off we are. "179 The White House decided that the best way to engage and isolate
Perot was in a head-to-head debate on NAFTA. Such a debate would provide the chance to
"provoke Perot into blowing his cool," which might discredit him as a legitimate political
player, and hurt the NAFTA opposition forces at the same time.lso
The Clinton administration wanted to make the debate a high stakes affair, which
led to the decision that Vice President Gore debate Perot personally. While Gore was
generally perceived by the public as a rather inanimate political figure, the White House
believed he would have a good chance at upsetting the usually folksy and amiable Perot,
and "the stakes were worth the risk ."181 Perot accepted the invitation to debate Gore on
"Larry King Live," and the date was set on November 9, 1993. The date of the debate

lended to the importance of the meeting, as it was during the height of congressional
deliberations regarding NAFrA At the time of the debate many members of congress
were still undecided about whether to support the agreement, enough members that passage
was still not assured. This led to speculation that the Gore-Perot debate could be "decisive"
in determining the fate of the bill. 182 The hype was enhanced as the White House and Perot
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representatives swapped pre-debate punches in the media in the weeks leading up to the
debate. I!)

In the actual meeting between Gore and Perot on "Larry King Live," the Clinton
strategy came to its fruition . Gore was able to provoke Perot with charges that the Texan
stood to gain money from NAFTA's defeat, and by painting Perot as one of Congress's
heaviest lobbyists seeking to "get tax breaks for your [Perot's] companies."I84 Perot
reacted to Gore's charges by losing his composure and charging that the vice-president was
"lying." The results of Perot's performance were apparent in the polls following the
debate. Perot'S favorability rating fell 10 points to 24 percent in the week following the
debate. ISS Perot's performance therefore had hun his credibility as a serious political
figure. The Clinton strategy also paid off in that congressional suppon for NAFTA
increased in the days after the debate, and NAFfA was finally passed. Passing NAFfA
and discrediting Perot were important achievements for Clinton during his first year in
office. NAFfA's passage bolstered Clinton's ability to propose further legislation and
policy reforms, and allowed the administration to function without Perot looming as a
credible source of criticism.
Despite Perot's poor performance at the debate, many of his supporters and some
members of the media were of the opinion that Perot's participation in the debate was more
important than the final resul L lS6 For Perot to be recognized as the leader of the NAFfA
opposition, and to then share the stage with the Vice President of the United States was
proof that he was recognized as a legitimate political player, even a full year after his
election defeat. Perot's involvement in the opposition to NAFTA, and his debate
appearance, were the first examples of the continued role Perot would play after the 1992
election. He was maintaining a political profile and defying the historical norm of minor
183

Ibid.

t84 William Safire, "A Sputtering Perot GeLS Gored ."
t85 Richard L. Berke, "He's Down in the Polls, but Perot Warns a Health Care Fight Looms,"
The New York Times, December 10, 1993, p. A24.
186

Debbie Howlett, "Perot's Auack Against NAFfA 'Just Warmin' Up' ," USA Today,
November 11. 1993, p. SA.

52
party candidates fading into obscurity. Perot would continue to remain active the following

year as he prepared to playa role in the 1994 midterm elections.

The 1994 Election
While Perot maintained a low political profile after his poor showing at the NAFTA
debate, UWSA and other Perot supporters were becoming increasingly active in preparing
for the 1994 elections. The special elections in 1993 and 1994 were early indicators of the
role UWSA would play, the tactics they would employ, and the potential benefits for
candidates friendly with a Perot/UWSA agenda. It should be noted that UWSA was
prevented from making official endorsements of specific candidates because of its pending
tax-exempt status as an educational, nonpartisan, nonprofit political organization.P?
However, UWSA did find ways to let its preference for certain candidates be known
without officially endorsing them .
Two special elections provided the first cases of Perot and UWSA involvement in
elections following the presidential contest. In Georgia, incumbent Senator Wyche Fowler
was defeated in a runoff election by Paul Coverdell. In the original election on November
3, 1992, Fowler won a plurality of rhe vote, but not the majority of votes cast, which is
required by Georgia law to win the election. I &8 On November 24, a runoff election was
held between Fowler and Coverdell. Coverdell , the Republican challenger received an
official endorsement from UWSA during the runoff campaign. UWSA was permitted to
make an official endorsement in this case because at the time of the runoff UWSA was still
considered pan of Perot's presidential campaign organization, allowing it to officially
endorse candidates.ts?
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In the 1993 Texas special election to fill the Senate seat vacated by Lloyd Bentsen,
Republican candidate Kay Bailey Hutchinson held a commanding lead in the weeks leading
up to the election. Nonetheless, two days before the election, Perot and the head of the
UWSA Texas chapter appeared with Hutchinson to announce that a survey showed 84
percent of the Texas chapter's members supported the Republican norninee.P" However
clearly this announcement favored Hutchinson, it could not be characterized as an official
endorsement; it was merely an announcement of a UWSA membership poll's results .
Hutchinson went on to win the election by a landslide.
Early elections in 1994 saw more success for candidates who received backing
from Perot and UWSA. In a May special House election for Kentucky's second district
seat, Republican Ron Lewis benefited from advertisements run in local papers by UWSA
Kentucky. The ads noted that Lewis supported major points of the UWSA reform agenda
and that he had attended UWSA events. The ad went on to note that Joe Prather, the
Democratic nominee, had "refused to respond to [a] questionnaire [about issue stands]" and
that he had "declined to participate in UWSA forums. "191 The message of the ad "was
easily discernible: Lewis fit the UWSA ideal."l92 Lewis went on to win the election, the
first Republican to win in that district in 129 years. l93 Also in May. Oklahoma had a
special election to replace retiring Representative Glenn English. While both Dan Webber
Jr., the Democrat, and Frank Lucas. the Republican candidate. had participated in UWSA
forums and had responded to the group's questionnaire on policy stands, Lucas's
campaign received and was bolstered by UWSA support. Just four days before the
election, members of UWSA held a news conference to announce that a poll of its members
revealed that 86 percent preferred Lucas. Again, this did not constitute an official
endorsement, bur the UWSA announcement clearly noted the group's preference. With the
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support of UWSA. Lucas went on to victory. ending 20 years of Democratic control over
the 6th district House seat in Kentucky.I?"
The impact of Perot and UWSA on elections is unclear, but even if UWSA
involvement in elections did not determine the final outcomes. it "put candidates on notice
that they [UWSA] are for real" and that candidates should "take them more seriously in
November."19S Candidates of both parties would have to pay attention to Perot voters and
UWSA and consider their potential impact in the fall elections.
Republicans enjoyed an apparent advantage with Perot and UWSA support in post
1992 special elections. However. they were not guaranteed favorites for such support in
the 1994 midterm elections. The lessons of the 1992 presidential election gave GOP
candidates cause for alarm in 1994. While Perot and his supporters claimed they were not
responsible for electing Clinton, "Perot's presence on the ballot appeared to cost President
George Bush more votes than it cost Democratic challenger Bill Clinton."I96 The lesson of

1994 was that while voters had been and could continue to be more inclined to align
themselves with Republicans. they were willing to abandon the major parties for an
alternative, or in many cases not to vote at all.
Republicans had provided the base support for NAFTA's passage in 1993, as more
Republicans than Democrats supported the agreement in both the Senate and the House.P?
Perot voters who watched the NAFfA debate on CNN noted "We're keeping score for '94
- we're getting serious."
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This desire to hold NAFTA supporters accountable for their

vote was apparent at a UWSA meeting in Texas held during the August congressional
recess. Newly elected Senator Hutchinson, who had received UWSA support in the
special election, was in anendance at the meeting. When the attendees were asked if they
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would vote for Hutchinson again if she supported the NAFTA agreement. only two
indicated they would (she eventually did vote for the agreernentj.P?
Democrats obviously faced challenges from UWSA and Perot voters in the 1994
election. For Democrats, congressional accountability meant not only being responsible in-

pan for helping President Clinton pass NAFrA. but also failure to "to deal with the federal
budget and deficiL"200 As the majority party, the Democrats were in charge of getting
business done in Washington. and if nothing was getting done, they would in effect be
responsible for the continuing state of "business as usual in Washington.t-?' The
Democrats failed to pass reform measures of interest to Perot and his supporters, which
fueled the perception that the Democrats were unable to proceed on major policy initiatives
even with control of two branches of government. Such failed initiatives included the
major lobbying reform and campaign finance reform bills passed by the House during the

103rd Congress, which were blocked by Republican filibusters in the Senate during the
final days of the Congress.P- Further, many Democrats were opposed to a number of the
specific reform measures sought by Perot and UWSA, such as term limits, a line item veto
for the president, and a balanced budget amendment.
Although the 1992 election sent a strong message of reform and the need for
change, many Democrats in Washington did not take the message seriously. Speaker of
the House Tom Foley in many ways reflected the less than energized response and attention
the Democratic Congress gave

to

a reform agenda, when in a meering with Democratic

freshmen members he "argued that nobody would be concerned about congressional
reform by the time of the 1994 elections. "203 However, this lack of progress in enacting
reforms was noted by voters . As early as the Spring of 1993, just months into the new
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congress. 73 percent of Perot's 1992 supporters thought Washington was the same as
before the 1992 election.P' This sentiment continued throughout the 103rd Congress. In
July of 1994, three months before the midterm elections. a Washington Post-ABC News
poll showed 60 percent of Americans disapproved of the job Congress was doing. 20S Exit
polls conducted on election day 1994 showed American voters in general remained largely
unhappy with the way the federal government had continued to operate under the Clinton
administration and the 103rd Congress, as 71 percent felt either dissatisfied or angry with
the way the government was working. 206
The question in 1994 was whether Perot supporters would continue to actively
participate in campaigns and vore on election day. Would they participate and be interested
in races not personally involving Perot or other candidates running in a Perot supported
third party? The Republican party was so concerned with the potential impact of Perot
voters in the midterm elections that they focused their polling on Perot voters when
developing the Contract With Arnerica.P? The Republican plan to target issues of interest
to Perot voters in the Conn-act With America was in part responsible for the GOP success
in attracting Perot voters. In the days leading up to the election. Democratic pollster
Stanley Greenberg acknowledged the Republican's success in courting the Perot vote.
Greenberg noted that Perot voter support for the Republicans made the election look "pretty
grim " for the Democrats.Pt
According to political scientists Walter Stone and Ronald Rapoport, who have been
studying a group of two thousand Perot voters since the 1992 election. many Perot
supporters who became politically active working for Perot in 1992, remained politically
active on behalf of the major parties in the following election. The phenomenon of
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supporters becoming active in an initial campaign and then continuing to be active (not
necessarily for the same candidate or party) is referred to by political scientists as the
"spillover effect" When considering the potential "spillover" from activity in the 1992
Perot campaign, the logical assumption might have been that Perot voters. who by and
large had been mobilized to political activity by Perot championing an anti-party message
for alienated voters in 1992, would not become involved in subsequent major party
contests. However, Stone and Rapoport demonstrated that a statistically significant
number of Perot activists were drawn into supporting major pany candidates in 1994,
expanding the major parties' support base .209 While many Perot supporters remained
active in major party campaigns, others did not continue to be politically active. The
dissatisfaction and alienation many Perot voters had felt before the 1992 election continued
in 1994. Such feelings of continued dissatisfaction with the parries and the federal
government may have contributed to their decision not to vote in the midterm election.
While voters in general are less active in nonpresidenrial elections, exit polls from 1994
suggest that Perot voters were less active relative to those who supported one of the major
parties in 1992. Exit polls in 1994 showed that only 14 percent of all voters in the
congressional midterm election had voted for Perot in the last presidential election, lower
than Perot's 19 percent share of the electorate in 1992, while Bush and Clinton supporters
remained within 1 percent of their 1992 share of the electorare.t'?
It is not surprising. given the Republican policy inclinations of Perot voters, as well
as their support for GOP candidates in the earlier special elections, that Perot supporters
and UWSA members overwhelmingly supported Republicans in the 1994 congressional
elections. Democratic pollster Peter Hart showed no surprise as Perot voters supported
Republicans in 1994, calling the "Perot factor" "ephemeral heresy ... [because] they left
George Bush for Ross Perot in 1992, and (hey are returning to the Republican Party in
in the 1992 Perot Movement
Perot Activists in the 1994 U.S. HouseElections," presented at the American Political Science
Association Conference, Chicago, IL, September 2, 1995.
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1994. "211 While Democrats and Republicans had evenly split the Perot vote in
congressional elections in 1992, the Republicans received a greater share in 1994, as nearly
two-thirds voted for GOP candidarcs.s'? Further, Perot voters who had contributed to
UWSA (about 4 percent of the total electorate), voted 69 percent for Republican

candidates.t'?
While Perot supporters were cited as potential swing votes in a number of contests
in the final days of the 1994 campaign, the extent of their acrual impact is largely the subject
of speculation. Three weeks before the election , Perot personally endorsed the
Republicans, adding that his followers should also support the GOP on election day.214
Appearing on "Larry King Live," Perot responded to a question about the failures of the
Democratic 103rd Congress by noting, "For the last forty years the Democrats have
controlled the House of Representatives. For the last 60 years they've [Democrats]
controlled the Senate for all but 12 years . Those folks who work for us haven't done a
good job for all those years.'?'> Accordingly, Perot concluded that it was time for
Americans to give Republicans "a tum at bat. "216
The impact of Perot supporters and UWSA was important in House Speaker Tom
Foley's reelection bid, one of the most watched races in the country.U? Foley was locked
in a tight race with George Nethercutt, a relatively unknown Republican. The race was
particularly interesting because a House speaker had not lost a reelection bid since 1860,
when William Pennington was defeated."! UWSA work in Washington advocating the
election of new congressional representatives had particularly hurt Foley, who was fighting

211

Rosensiiel, "Perot Voter's Leaning to the Right in '94,"

212 "The Dancers of Dallas," The Economist. August 12, 1995. p. 26 .
213

"Victory by the Numbers," Time, November 21,1994. p. 64.

214 Rosenstiel, "Perot Voter's Leaning 10 the Right in '94."
215 Katherine Seelye, "Perot Urges Voters to Fill Congress With Republicans," The New York Times,
October 6, 1994, p. 022.
216

Ibid.

217 Rosenstiel, "Perot Voter's Leaning to the Right in '94.
218 Timothy Egan,

n

"Foley, Defending Congress to the LaSI, Concedes Defeat 10 Newcomer,"
The New York Times, November 10,1994 , p. B3.

59
a race defined by his experience and lengthy tenure in Washington, D.C.219 While
activities by UWSA favored the Republicans as the parry of "change", exit polls revealed
that Ross Perot's official endorsement of the Republicans on "Larry King Live" only made
9 percent of voters more likely to vote Republican, while it made 13 percent of all voters
more likely to support Democrats.P?
Any assessment of the "Perm factor" in the 1994 election must acknowledge the
larger historical significance of the groups continued organization and involvement in
electoral politics after the 1992 election. Perot and UWSA showed a willingness in 1994 to
cross-endorse major party candidates, one of Theodore Lowi's criteria for a genuine third
party. While Perot and UWSA primarily endorsed Republican candidates, Perot showed a
willingness to endorse Democrats as well, as his endorsement of Governor Roy Romer
indicated 22\ This type of activity further met Lowi's criteria to organize beyond a single
election, and showed a willingness to be involved in elections beyond the presidential level,
although there was no organized effort to run a slate of third party candidates. A study by
President Clinton 's pollster Stanley Greenberg recogniz.ed the continued importance of the
Perot movement as it identified Perot voters from 1992 as "the pivotal force in American
politics. I0222 While the Republicans clearly appealed to Perot voters on a number of reform
issues in 1994, it is not clear after a single election whether Perot voters have decided to
align themselves in the long run with Republicans. Republicans could have been the
beneficiaries of Perot voter support in 1994 because voters were returning to the party for
the long run. The Republicans may also have received the support of Perot voters only for
the 1994 election, as they offered the best alternative to the Democrats in Congress who
were not making progress on issues of interest to these voters. Analysis on how effective
the Republicans were at bringing Perot voter support to their party and how long-lasting
this support is will largely depend on the resul ts of the 1996 and future elections.
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However, moves by Perot in the Fall of 1995 indicated the Republicans would have to
strengthen and continue their efforts as Perot continued to chart a course challenging the
major parties.

The Road to 1996
By the summer of 1995 Perot was positioning UWSA to playa role in the 1996
presidential election. Once again, Perot had to decide what role he and UWSA wanted to
play in the race. Were the major parties addressing UWSA concerns? Should UWSA
support the efforts of either of the major parties? Should Perot run again? Would UWSA
be used as the building block for a third party? These questions led Perot to call a massive
three day conference in Dallas in August 1995 .

The UWSA Conference
The declared purpose of the conference was to discuss the topic of "Preparing Our
Country for the 21st Century." The conference, held in Dallas on August lI-D, featured
political leaders from the major parries and covered a broad agenda. The Dallas gathering
featured appearances by the major party leaders from the Congress and national party
organizations, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich, House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt, Senate Majority Whip Trent Lott, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle,
Democratic National Committee Chair Senator Chris Dodd, and Republican National
Committee Chair Haley Barbour. Participants addressed a wide range of issues including
the tax system, the deficit, social security reform , the role of the United States overseas, as
well as general discussions about government and leadership for America in the next
century. The conference received significant press coverage from the national media, and
portions of the conference were covered live on CSPAN and CNN. Larry King, with his
history of close ties to Perot, moved his show to the Dallas convention site and aired
special weekend editions.
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The conference was not only notable for maintaining Perot and UWSA's political
profiles, but also for the concerted effort displayed by Republican parry members to use the
conference as an opportunity to coopt Perot voters and to dissuade Perot from launching
another presidential bid. As Frank Luntz, a prominent Republican pollster, put it, "The
Perot voting block is the key to 1996."223 The Republicans recognized that Perot had cut
away from Bush's support in 1992, and felt that if Perot were to run again he would
threaten

to

undermine the GOP nominee in 1996. If Perot stayed out of the race, the

Republicans would have a chance to appeal to the Perot voters, and potentially persuade the
block to vote Republican.
By the time of the August conference a preliminary group of Republicans had
declared their candidacies for the GOP presidential nomination. Ten Republican
challengers accepted Perot's invitation to attend and make addresses. These candidates
primarily focused their message on issues important to Perot voters. including discussion
of budget deficits. a line-item veto. a balanced budget amendment, the GATT and NAFrA
agreements, and term limits. However, it was long-shot contenders like Pat Buchanan and
Pete.Wilson who got the best reaction from the Perot voters at the conference, rather than
Bob Dole. the favorite to win the GOP nomination. This was largely attributed to Perot
voter concerns that Dole had spent too much time in Washington and was not capable of
making the reforms desired by Perot voters .P" While a group of congressional Democrats
and members of national Democratic organizations attended the conference. President
Clinton refused the invitation to attend . Following the strong support Republicans received
from Perot voters in 1994, the Clinton administration seemed content to write off attempts
at coopting these voters. 225 Clinton chose to send Mack McLarty, a presidential counselor,
to the conference as a representative of the Administration. a choice that did not lend the
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conference the credibility associated with having the president accept an invitation and
attend.
Conference participants questioned whether the major parties could bring about the
necessary reforms in Washington. This concern fueled speculation among both
participants and the media as to whether Perot would form a third party and mount a
challenge in 1996. Perot had hinted in his endorsement of the Republicans in 1994 that if
they could not bring change to Washington he would be willing to start a third party
challenge in 1996.226 Perot supporters and UWSA members expressed their desire for
such a party to the media throughout the convention.P? Guarding against such a
development, Republican presidential hopeful Lamar Alexander urged Perot to work with
the Republicans, noting that a third party challenge would almost ensure a second term for
President Clinton. Perot did not allude to, or make promises about, what role he might
personally play in the 1996 contest, but he did press the Democrats and Republicans to
make progress on reform agenda measures including campaign finance reform and
restrictions on lobbyists. Perot noted that progress on such reforms would be what he
considered "the nicest Christmas present you [the parties] could give the American
people."228 Perot's emphasis away from the rhetoric of the Dallas conference to action in
Washington was characteristic of what UWSA members and other Perot supporters wanted
to see from the major parties. Ideology and shared positions on issues were not enough,
action would be needed before the GOP's appeals would be taken seriously.
The 104th Congress did make progress on lobbying reform before the end of the
year by passing legislation requiring public disclosure of [he identities, incomes,
employers, and causes of lobbyists.F? Despite this progress on lobbying reform, no action
was made on other reform measures, such as campaign finance reform. This lack of

2:26 Seelye, "Perot Urges Voters to Fill Congress With Republicans."
21:T Rezendes. "Perot Seeks Bipartisan Contract:' p. 1.
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substantive progress on many reform measures, and the general continuation of "gridlock"

in Washington the following Fall left reformers doubting whether the major parties could
get the job done. These doubts prompted Perot

[0

take further action to advance the reform

agenda in 1996 by creating a new political pany.

The Reform Party
Having defied history by remaining a high profile political figure three years after
losing the 1992 election, Perot announced his intention to form a new political party on
CNN's "Larry King Live" on September 25, 1995. Perm noted he would have preferred
to wait until 1996 before getting Started, allowing Democrats and Republicans a six-month
period after the Dallas UWSA conference to make progress on a reform agenda. However,
ballot access rules for third parries in three states (CA, ME, ND) required filing before the
end of 1995 . Perot wanted to ensure that the" two thirds of the American people [who]
won't attach themselves to either party and want an independent party" were not ignored in
the 1996 election, a move that required action before the end of 1995. According to Perot,
it was simple a case of being "stuck with rules" governing ballot access, and the formation
of the new party was in no way a response to party leaders folJowing the August
conference. However, as Perot emphasized the point that the party leaders who had
attended his conference "didn't disappoint us, " he was skeptical that the parries would ever
address tough reform issues like passing term limits, balancing the budget, and setting
righter rules governing ethics.P?
As Perot made his case for the third party option, it was apparent that he believed an
alternative to the major parties was needed to address the larger systemic problems of
American government and politics. Perot told King that Americans have reached a "critical
time in American history" when the government needs reforming and voter faith can be
restored. Perot alluded to the alienation of the American voters from their government.

230 From Ross Perot appearance on "Larry King Live ," CNN, September 25. 1995.
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citing the decline in voter faith in government and parry identification as evidence of the
public's desire for a new alternative.
Perot tried to emphasize that the new party endeavor was not a personal quest, but
rather was a tactical decision for the good of America. Perot told King "I don't need a
party to run in, I can run as an independent," and he repeatedly said "this is not about
me. "131 While the formation of the Reform Party may have not been "about" Perot, it
certainly was dependent upon his personal wealth . An indication of Perot's commitment to
the party was evident in his willingness to provide the necessary capital for getting the party
organized and off the ground. Perot did note that he intended the parry to become
financially independent, saying that once the parry was up and running he could step back
and it could be funded from member contributions.
The platform of the Reform Parry reflected Perot's belief in the need for large
structural reforms of the American government The party outlined nine general areas for
government reform, including high ethical standards for the White House and Congress,
balancing the budget, campaign reform, term limits for Congress, creating a new tax
system, reform of the Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security systems. and restricting
lobbyists, with specific restrictions on the operation of both foreign and domestic
Iobbyists .P? Perot noted that the Reform party would not get involved with divisive social
issues like abortion, because the party's focus was on reforming government and restoring
voter confidence, and not "issues that will not determine the success or failure of our
country .''233
The Reform Party has established guidelines for choosing a presidential candidate.
According to Perot, after the parry is finished organizing and qualifying for the ballot in
each of the fifty states, it will hold its own primary where any individual who receives the
support of 10 percent of the party's petition signers could qualify . The national Reform
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Party will then circulate materials to state and local offices about the candidates who
qualified, and the party will have a national convention. The convention will be linked by
satellite to state and local organization gatherings, so that members can view speeches made
by the qualifying candidates. Finally, registered party members will vote electronically and
the winner will be nominated by the party.234
The organization of the Reform Party followed many of Lowi's criteria for a
genuine third party. By deciding to form the party in time for it to qualify on every state's
ballot, Perot followed Lowi's principle that a party must be competitive and focused on
winning elections. If Perot had waited until sometime in 1996 to decide on organizing a
challenge (not necessarily for himself), the third party option would not have been practical
since by that time a third party could not qualify for the ballot in all states. The only
available option would be to launch an independent bid similar to the 1992 effon.
Perot chose to create a lasting organization which will be a presence in future
elections, rather than focusing on organizing temporary challenges to the major parries by
way of independent campaigns. By creating a campaign organization that would last
beyond a single election, Perot met another of Lowi's criteria for forming a genuine third

parry. While UWSA had provided the organizational foundation for Perot's continued
activity after 1992, the creation of the Reform Party went the extra step towards providing
an election apparatus to run and endorse candidates in elections.
The Reform Party was established by Perot with the intention of running a
presidential nominee in the 1996 election. The interest in nominating only a presidential
candidate violates Lowi's criteria for a genuine third pany that runs candidates at all levels
of government. However, Perot noted the Reform Pany would cross-endorse major party
nominees for other offices in 1994 if they were willing to pledge the party's platform. The
invitation for endorsements appears to be limited only to major party nominees, as local and
State level candidates who have claimed an affiliation with the Reform Party have not been

234 Ibid.
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endorsed by the national party for the 1996 election, because of concerns over the quality
and motivations of such candidates.P> Perot did not rule out that the Reform Party could
eventually develop to run candidates for all levels of office in future elections.
Lowi's final criteria for forming a genuine third party is that the party be built
bottom-up, based on grass roots initiatives. Perot has maintained since he initially entered
the 1992 presidential race that he was the candidate and choice of a grass roots movement.
However, Perot has been criticized by Lowi and others since 1992 for being a "dictator"
who has mishandled and dominated a grass roots movement- Regardless of these charges,
his movement has widespread popular support. The Reform Party, like Perot's 1992
campaign and UWSA, has established state and local offices across the nan on. Supporters
have organized to establish the Reform Party in all fifty states. 236 The state and local level
support the Reform Party has received matches the spirit of Lowi's criteria for grass roots
support, as Americans have become politically active as "petition gatherers" and "door
knockers" working to establish the party.
Even though the Reform Pany effon is well financed and has gotten underway
early in the election cycle, it is important to remember that the barriers to establishing a third
party are substantial. Like the qualifications for independent candidates, third party ballot
access rules are set by the individual states and have varied conditions. As Perot noted, a
number of states have early filing deadlines to discourage third party formation. Further,
when the formation of the Reform Party was announced, thirteen states had no official
procedure for third parries to gain access to the baUoe 237
Guidelines for third party public financing have not changed significantly since

1980 when Anderson tried to form the American Independence Parry. New parties can still
only qualify for a fraction of what the major parry candidates automatically receive, and
most of this is in a retroactive manner based on the third party's showing in election
235 Ray Huard, "Candidates Try for Seats Via Reform Party,"
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results. This may not prove to be a great concern to Perot and organizers of the Reform
Party, since they do not believe in the public finance system's use of tax payer money to
fund campaigns. The Reform Party will likely rely on Perot's personal wealth until such
time as fundraising can support viable challenges to the major parties. The question for the
Reform Party is whether they will be able to achieve an equal financial footing without
Perot's help, given the substantial sums that the major party nominees will continue to
receive from public financing and the national party organizations.
The winner-take-all nature of the electoral college has not changed since 1992, and
it will continue to limit the competitiveness of third party and independent candidates.
Electoral votes are still awarded in each Slate on a winner-take-all basis, providing no
reward for second or third place candidates. For this reason, voters could continue to favor
the clear choices provided by the two major parties. The potential for voters to be
concerned about "wasting" their vote and viability of third and independent candidates will
also continue to exist.

Conclusion
American politics has traditionally been dominated by major parries and their
candidates. Third party and independent candidates have rarely played more than a
peripheral role in elections, and when they have, it has only been a transient phenomenon.
Ross Perot's independent candidacy in the 1992 election was a significant part of the
election. Perot's continued role in the political process has made him unique among
nonmajor party candidates in that he has defied the dominant pattern of nonrnajor parry
candidates fading into obscurity following the election.

In 1992, American voters were dissatisfied and angry with the Republican and
Democratic parries and the way the federal government was working. These feelings made
the electorate receptive to Perot's independent candidacy. While Perot was a political
amateur, he was embraced by many of the disenfranchised voters for his "outsider"
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qualifications. Perot focused his campaign rhetoric on criticizing the federal government,
and on promoting discussion of America's debt problem. Despite Perot's limited issues
focus, he received 19 percent of (he vote on election day, the second best showing by a
non major party candidate this century.
Perot was able [0 overcome the traditional barriers of ballot access and campaign
finance in 1992. These barriers had limited nonmajor party success in previous elections,
but Perot was able to organize a successful 50 state ballot access campaign, and his
enormous personal wealth ensured he could fund a competitive campaign. Perot was hurt
by the traditional barrier of the electoral college, as its winner-take-all provisions continued
to favor the major party candidates.
Perot's 1992 campaign created some early political legacies. First, and foremost,
Perot showed how a wealthy candidate could bypass the campaign finance barriers
associated with the FECA and public finance. Perot used $63 million from his own wealth
to fund a campaign that could compete with the major parties' publicly financed campaigns.
The Perot campaign was therefore not limited financially from hiring adequate staff,
funding a media campaign, and mounting a successful ballot access effort,
The Perot 1992 campaign also demonstrated the potential for political amateurs to
playa significant role in presidential politics when voters are unhappy with the government
and the major parties, Perot had no campaign experience before his 1992 bid., a factor that
apparently aided his image with voters of being a political "outsider." The angry mood of
the electorate and voters' dissatisfaction with the government and panies was an important
condition for Perot's success. Because the electorate was so upset with politics as usual,
voters were receptive to an alternative to the major party candidates in 1992. It did not
matter how politically inexperienced Perot was, or how ill-defined his message may have
been. Theodore Lowi has asserted that Perot was different from previous nonmajor parry
candidates because his support was not centered on a specific issue. but rather on the
alternative to the major parry candidates he offered to voters . Perot did make the national
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debt a campaign issue in 1992, but to a greater extent, the headway he made with the voters
was founded on their anger towards the government and major parries.
Perot's continued political activity following the 1992 election has made him a
significant figure in American politics. Previous nonmajor parry candidates have either
faded into political obscurity following elections, or have returned to political activity in the
major parties. Following the 1992 election, Perot organized United We Stand America as a
"watchdog" political group to follow government progress on measures like lobbying
reform and campaign finance reform. Perot played an active role throughout 1993 in
opposing the NAFTA agreement, a role which led to a debate on "Larry King Live"
between himself and Vice President Gore. UWSA played a role in the 1994 midterm
elections by promoting and unofficially endorsing a number of Republican candidates, and
Perot made an announcement urging his supporters to vote Republican on election day.
Perot and UWSA hosted a convention in the summer of 1995 that attracted important
political figures from the major parties. as well as national media attention. Finally, Perot
has taken the initial steps towards forming a third pany for the 1996 and future elections.
All of these activities have secured a place for Perot in American politics beyond a single
election. Perot will continue to be a relevant figure on a personal level, and the
organization of UWSA and the Reform Party offer the potential for Perot to have a legacy
beyond his own personal involvement in politics.
Even if Perot were to fade from the American political scene, UWSA and the
Reform Party will still have an impact the political process. UWSA demonstrated during
the 1994 midterm elections its potential to play an active role in electoral politics. The
group showed that as a political "watchdog" organization it could not only monitor the
government's progress on passing reform legislation, but it could hold candidates
accountable for not promoting progress on government reform. UWSA has the potential to
continue its role as a political "watchdog" group promoting government action on a reform
agenda, and to support candidates responsive to a reform agenda in future elections.
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Perot's organization of the Reform Party will have an immediate impact on the
electoral process, and it holds the potential to influence future elections. The Reform Parry
will change the rules governing elections, as the parry attempts to attain ballot access in all
fifty states. When Perot made the announcement of the party's formation, thirteen states
had no provisions for a third party to qualify for ballot access. The Reform Parry will at
least force these thirteen states to adopt provisions for third parry ballot access, defining the
rules that will govern future third party attempts to gain ballot access. Perot and the
Reform Party could also mount legal challenges to states with particularly difficult ballot
access provisions, a move that would further pave the way for future third parties to qualify
for the ballot
The Reform Party holds the greatest potential for the Perot movement to have an
impact on nonmajor party activity in future elections. As organization of the Reform Party
continues, the question is whether Perot's effort will led to the formation of a viable and
genuine third party. The potential to form such a third parry has existed since Perot's 1992
campaign, and has been recognized by political scientists, including Theodore Lowi. Lowi
has developed criteria for creating a genuine third party that would assure that the party
remains viable in future elections, and Perot has incorporated many of these criteria in his
plans for the Reform Pany.
The Reform Parry meets Lowi's criteria in that it will be competitive and focused on
winning elections. it will cross-endorse other parries' candidates, and it will have
organization to last beyond a single election. Although the Reform Party will only support
a presidential nominee in 1996, Perot has announced his willingness

[0

develop the party

into an organization that runs candidates for all levels of political office. Whether Perot
meets Lowi's requirement that a genuine third pany be formed from "grass roots
initiatives" is less clear. Lowi believes that Perot has too much control over the grass roots
movement that supports him for a genuine third party to develop. Regardless of Lowi's
contention, the grass roots movement behind Perot has developed some organization in all
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fifty states, and enjoys widespread popular support. By following Lowi's criteria, the
Reform Party should become a viable and genuine third party in future elections.
Perot's 1992 campaign and continued political activity after the election were in pan
dependent upon his personal wealth, as he was able to finance campaigns and build
political organizations. However. Perot's success in 1992 and after the election has also
been possible because of the continued feelings among voters of dissatisfaction and anger
towards the government and the major parties. Perot's supporters account for nearly one in
five of all voters, and they have become the critical swing vote for elections after 1992.
The importance of Perot voters was evident in 1994 as the Republicans sought to capture
their vote by promoting reform issues in the Contract With America . The Perot voters will
likely playa significant role in the 1996 election , even if Perot is not personally involved.

The popular support for a third alternative to the major parties goes beyond Perot
and his supporters. While Perot and his supporters may be the most recognizable political
block outside of the major parties. they are only a fraction of the voters who are angry and
dissatisfied. A majority of Americans feel alienated from the government, think the nation
is headed in the wrong direction, and want a third option to the major parties and their
candidates. Perot has not received the support of most of this group, and with or without
Perot and his organizations, these angry and dissatisfied voters will continue to have an
impact on future elections. The real potential for third party success lies with this group. If
they continue to be feel alienated and unhappy with the government and the major political
parties, they could provide support for alternatives to the major parties.
The 1992 Perot presidential campaign was one of the most successful nonrnajor
party campaigns this century, and it has become the foundation for significant political
activity outside of the major parties. Ross Perot established himself as an important figure
in American politics during the 1992 campaign, and he has become further notable for his
continued role in politics following the election. Perot's initial campaign has produced two
political organizations that have provided Perot and his supporters a means of remaining
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politically active following the 1992 election. Perot's supporters, and other angry
American voters, have provided Perot with support for his political activities, and hold the
potential to have a further impact on future elections. The 1992 Perot movement was not
the typical isolated and short-lived challenge to the major parties, but rather the foundation
for continued nonmajor parry political activity.
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